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Hollow Spaces
CHARLES H. BROWER II†
INTRODUCTION
Restatements entail magisterial achievements, in which
every word receives and survives scrutiny by “thousands[] of
. . . adept juridical eyes.”1 Heavy tomes set forth the law
exhaustively and with painstaking attention to detail.2 In
the end, they project a weight of authority that almost
defies criticism.3 Even at the milestone known as Tentative
Draft No. 2 of the Restatement of the U.S. Law of
International Commercial Arbitration (Draft Restatement),4
dozens of sections and hundreds of pages embody a
formidable distillation of wisdom.5
† Professor of Law, Wayne State University; Vice-Chair, Institute for
Transnational Arbitration; Member, American Law Institute’s Members
Consultative Group for the Draft Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial Arbitration; Winner of the Smit-Lowenfeld Prize (2012).
1. Richard A. Falk, Conceptual Foundations, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 439, 440
(1989).
2. Id. at 439.
3. Id.
4. For a description of the evolution of Restatements from Preliminary
Drafts, to Council Drafts, to Tentative Drafts and Official Drafts, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES XI
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 2)] (encompassing more than three dozen sections and 400
pages of text).
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To remain credible at this stage, criticism must aim not
at the hardened shells of the surviving words, but at the
hollow spaces left by omissions that raise doubts about
structural integrity. Building on the concepts of hollow
spaces and things left undone, this article explores the
failure to adopt an explicit standard for managing the
central challenge posed by U.S. Restatements on
international topics, namely the charting of a deliberate
course among domestic, foreign, and global sources in the
elaboration of international law.6 To that end, Part I
elaborates the unusual challenges faced by this genre of
Restatements.7
Next, Part II reviews American Law Institute (ALI)
practice, documenting the importance of drafting standards
in the context of two Restatements on Foreign Relations. In
so doing, Part II.A describes how the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations successfully used a drafting standard
to emphasize global perspectives.8 By contrast, Part II.B
describes the neglect of drafting standards in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, as well as the
unfortunate consequences.9
Building on the lessons to be drawn from Part II, Part
III proposes a drafting standard for the Restatement on
International Commercial Arbitration that reflects a more
domestic orientation. In so doing, Part III.A illustrates how
any drafting standard could have been more effective in
bringing protagonists to equilibrium on controversial topics,
6. See George A. Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International
Commercial Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 175, 182 (2009)
[hereinafter Bermann (N.Y.U.)] (explaining that “there exists an entire overlay
of challenges that are traceable specifically to the international character of the
subject undergoing restatement,” including the question of “how conscious
should one be, in restating the U.S. law of an international subject, of the legal
principles and practices within other jurisdictions?”); George A. Bermann et al.,
Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2009) [hereinafter Bermann et al. (PENN. ST.)] (“[T]here are .
. . separate questions about the role of foreign and international decisions in a
restatement of U.S. law.”).
7. See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
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such as the legal status of interim measures.10 Part III.B, in
turn, explains why a domestic orientation seems consistent
with views expressed in the reporters’ academic writings.11
It also explains why an emphasis on domestic perspectives
seems likely to enhance the Draft Restatement’s public
reception outside the charmed circle of international
arbitration specialists.12
Adding granularity, Part IV refines the proposed
drafting standard to encompass the rules that the United
States Supreme Court would apply if charged with deciding
a controversy in the field of international commercial
arbitration. In so doing, Part IV examines the Court’s role
both in limiting the reporters’ discretion on reasonably
settled issues and in guiding their consideration of
unresolved issues.13 With respect to the last point, it
explains how the reporters could avoid the perils of
speculation and vote-counting by focusing on the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the predicate issues of treaty and
statutory interpretation.14
Next, using the forum non conveniens doctrine, Part V
illustrates the proper application of Supreme Court
jurisprudence to the interpretation of relevant treaties, such
as the New York Convention.15 Finally, using the Draft
Restatement’s fusion of the grounds for vacating U.S.
Convention awards with the grounds for refusing to enforce
Convention awards,16 Part VI illustrates the proper
application
of
Supreme
Court
jurisprudence
to
10. See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
15. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention]; see also infra notes 125-287 and accompanying text.
16. Consistent with the Draft Restatement, this article defines a “U.S.
Convention award” as “an international arbitral award rendered in the United
States that arises out of a legal relationship” that possesses “some . . .
reasonable relation with one or more foreign States.” DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 1-1(i).
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interpretation of relevant statutes, such as the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).17 Whereas the analysis in Part III.B
tends to emphasize what the reporters have done right in
the Draft Restatement, Parts V and VI tend to identify
where they have gone wrong and where drafting standards
could have kept them on track.
I. CHALLENGES
Any Restatement calls on its drafters to sift through a
mass of judicial decisions and other sources of law, to distill
and reconcile those sources,18 and sometimes to bend the
path of the law to avoid the perils of obsolescence and
injustice.19 As mentioned above, U.S. Restatements on
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); see also infra notes 288-405 and accompanying
text.
18. Restatements have never aspired to be mere digests that simply record
“hundreds” of decisions. See The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Revised: How Were the Controversies Resolved?, 81 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 180, 189 (1987) [hereinafter 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.] (remarks
by Monroe Leigh); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES at XI (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS] (“The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law does not
purport to be a digest, the need for which is admirably met by Hackworth’s
Digest of International Law, ably supplemented by Whiteman’s Digest.”);
Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement Process, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 4
(2000) (emphasizing that “a Restatement is more than a digest of existing
cases.”). To the contrary, Restatements have always sought to streamline
inquiry by distilling a growing body of primary sources into clear statements
that capture the essence of the law. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of
Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 633
(1995); 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra at 189 (remarks by Monroe Leigh); see
also Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the Vision of the American
Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 145, 146 (2007) [hereinafter
Traynor, The First Restatements] (observing that Restatements have “made
significant contributions to unifying as well as simplifying and clarifying the
law”). Pursuit of these goals contemplates a process of sifting, distilling, and
reconciling sources.
19. In addition to seeking “clarification and simplification of the law,” the
ALI’s mission includes “better adaptation [of the law] to social needs,” as well as
pursuit of “the better administration of justice.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 1 (1923), http://www.ali.org/doc/charter.pdf.
Thus, “[w]hile Restatements of the law seek chiefly to clarify and consolidate the
law, they may also afford an occasion for some significant reshaping of the law
in one aspect or another.” Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 191.
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international topics pose the additional challenge of
charting a course among domestic, foreign, and global
perspectives in the elaboration of international law.20 To the
extent that they operate in fields regularly traversed by the
Supreme Court,21 the drafters of such Restatements also
face unusually high stakes. While the drafters of
Restatements on traditional, state law topics (such as
contracts, property, and torts) may claim success if their
work finds purchase in a handful of jurisdictions,22 the
drafters of Restatements on international topics (typically
regulated by federal statutes, treaties, or customary
international law)23 labor in a context where a single
Supreme Court judgment can result in total vindication or
total defeat of their work on any particular topic.24
Assuming risk to be a function of the probability and

20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
21. See Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 195 (observing that the Draft
Restatement “proceeds on terrain on which the Supreme Court has been
keeping remarkably busy . . . .”).
22. See id. at 192 (discussing traditional Restatement topics that were
governed by state law and observing that “while the courts of State A could not
be expected to follow a Restatement provision that conflicts with the enacted
legislation of that State, the same Restatement provision could nevertheless be
influential in States B and C . . . .”).
23. See id. at 193-96 (explaining the dominant role of federal statutes and
treaties in shaping the U.S. law of international commercial arbitration). Of
course, federal statutes, treaties, and customary international law all represent
federal law, subject to conclusive determination by the Supreme Court for
purposes of U.S. law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 4, § 111(1) (“International law and international agreements . . . are law of
the United States and supreme over the law of the several States.”); id. § 111
cmt. e (“Customary international law, like other federal law, is part of the ‘laws .
. . of the United States.’”); id. §112(2) (“The determination and interpretation of
international law present federal questions and their disposition by the United
States Supreme Court is conclusive for other courts in the United States.”).
24. Cf. Bermann (NYU), supra note 6, at 196-97 (“[I]t is one thing for the ALI
to develop a Restatement in a purely common law field, or in one populated by
few and scattered pieces of state or federal legislation—and quite another thing
to do so where not only a broad federal statute, but more important multilateral
and bilateral international conventions dominate the field.”).
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anticipated magnitude of a loss,25 U.S. Restatements on
international topics thus involve unusual perils that one
can mitigate only through the development and exercise of
appropriate precautions,26 including the discipline of
drafting standards.
In facing the unique challenges just described, the
reporters for the Draft Restatement must contend with at
least two complicating factors. First, the project lacks
guidance in the sense that international commercial
arbitration represents virgin territory for the American Law
Institute (ALI).27 Second, while the need for guidance may
25. See, e.g., Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999);
Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 677, 704 n.124 (1985).
26. Cf. Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants’ Liability to Third
Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting
Principle, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 345, 410 (1992) (“Thus, . . . risk is a function of
probability, magnitude, and precautions. The . . . risk increases with increases
in probability and magnitude and decreases with precautions.”).
27. Although referred to as the Draft Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of
International Commercial Arbitration, this represents the ALI’s first foray into
the topic of international commercial arbitration. The explanation for this
apparent discrepancy lies in the fact that the ALI has taken up the topic of
international commercial arbitration in the context of the third generation in its
series of Restatements. A similar discrepancy arose in the context of foreign
relations law, where the ALI first addressed the topic in the second series of
Restatements. See 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 180 (remarks by
Harold G. Maier); see also Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restatement’s Treatment
of Sources and Evidence of International Law, 25 INT’L LAW. 311, 312 n.5 (1991).
Unlike the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of International Commercial
Arbitration, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations could
at least take the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations as a starting point.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 3 (recognizing
that the volume “stands on the shoulders of the previous Restatement”); The
Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised),
76 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 184, 188 (1982) [hereinafter 76 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC.] (remarks by Louis Henkin) (“Let’s be clear: We have stood on the
shoulders of our predecessors.”). Likewise, the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations “were the beneficiaries of that great work, the
Harvard Research in International Law,” which some had regarded as the
equivalent of a Restatement. See 76 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra at 186
(remarks by Covey T. Oliver); see also THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROJECT
FOR WORK IN THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 63-64 (1955)
[hereinafter ALI FOREIGN RELATIONS PROJECT] (quoting Sir Arnold McNair)
(describing the Harvard Research publications as “Restatements”). The drafters
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be filled by roughly thirty advisors, who bring an amazing
depth of expertise, that group largely represents the inner
core of a small community of internationalists engaged in a
financially lucrative business.28 For a variety of reasons,
their views may not track the perspectives of U.S.
legislators and judges,29 who have the last word in
developing and applying the law.
of the Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration have no similar
foundation for their work.
28. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, at v
(listing thirty-three advisers, including twenty-one in private practice, three
academics with substantial arbitration practices, two in-house counsel, and just
two judges). One may objectively advance three propositions without casting
doubts on the integrity of practitioners involved in the field. First, international
arbitration represents an increasingly lucrative field of legal practice. See
Martha Neil, Small World, Big Business: International Arbitration Has Become
a Lucrative Field After Decades of Disfavor, 88 A.B.A. J., Sept. 2002, at 28, 28
(quoting one litigation partner for the proposition that the revenues generated
for his firm by international arbitration had increased tenfold over five years).
Beginning in the 1980s, large firms gravitated toward the field because the
damage claims, often in the hundreds of millions of dollars, could support large
fees incurred by large litigation teams. Id.; see also YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G.
GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6 (1996) (“Over the past
twenty-five to thirty years, international commercial arbitration has become big
legal business” involving “huge international construction projects such as the
tunnel under the English Channel . . . .”).
Second, U.S. firms compete fiercely for a greater share of that business. See
Robert W. Gordon, Money! Power! Ambition Gone Awry!, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr.
2006, 26, 31 (“American lawyers were competing fiercely for a share of the
increasingly lucrative business of international arbitration, formerly dominated
by Europeans . . . .”); Neil, supra at 28 (“[I]ncreasing numbers of American
attorneys are vying with foreign counsel for this lucrative business . . . .”).
Third, the international arbitration community represents an insular and elite
group that, by professional necessity, takes on a cosmopolitan mindset. See
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra at 8 (“The work . . . is a rather glamorous and . . . wellpaid activity associated with nice places, like Paris or Geneva, and a first-class
lifestyle. Only a very select and elite group of individuals is able to serve as
international arbitrators. They are purportedly selected for their ‘virtue’—
judgment, neutrality, expertise—yet rewarded as if they are participants in
international deal-making.”).
29. When compared to specialists in international commercial arbitration,
U.S. legislators and judges seem more likely to be generalists, less likely to be
internationalists, and less likely to have direct financial interests in the
popularity of the United States as a venue for international commercial
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Given the challenges already mentioned and the need to
produce a text that will command respect among
stakeholders for the next generation,30 the Draft
Restatement would benefit from a conscious elaboration of
principles used to select the respective emphasis on
domestic, foreign, and global perspectives. In addition, that
elaboration of principles would be particularly useful for
topics where large differences among the three perspectives
create opportunities for progressive development of the
law.31 Part II develops this point in light of ALI practice that
evolved in the context of two Restatements on Foreign
Relations.
II. ALI PRACTICE
A. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States
Turning to the question of ALI practice, one should
begin by observing that the drafters of the ALI’s first
international project recognized the tensions between
domestic and global perspectives, decided to emphasize the
latter, and codified that choice in a drafting standard
arbitration. See Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 161, 165 (2008) (remarks by Judge
Diane Wood) (“I want to begin with a caution: judges, at least U.S. federal
judges, are generalists . . . . We draw broadly on arbitration decisions of the
various courts in the United States whether they come from domestic or
international commercial disputes, and in some instances even if they come
from labor disputes . . . .”); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing
Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1, 34 (2008)
(“[M]embers of Congress are generalists who are usually not steeped in any of
the fields that they regulate.”).
30. One advantage of the ALI and its series of Restatements lies in the
perceived capacity to formulate texts that have a “reasonable shelf life and that
will be useful for a generation or more.” Traynor, The First Restatements, supra
note 18, at 164; see also Falk, supra note 1, at 441 (indicating that Restatements
have a “useful life of one generation”).
31. See The Revised Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States and Customary International Law, 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 73,
73 (1985) [hereinafter 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.] (remarks by Jack Goldklang,
Dep’t. of Justice) (“It is fair to begin by asking what philosophy underlies a work
as significant as the Restatement (Revised).”).
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formally approved by the ALI. Expanding on these points,
as early as 1955, preliminary sketches for the Restatement
(Second) on Foreign Relations recognized that the subject
matter consisted of (1) international law and (2) domestic
laws involving matters of substantial concern to foreign
relations.32 Because the domestic branch was grounded in
traditional sources and seemed “badly in need of
restating,”33 some participants favored it as the exclusive
focus of the Restatement.34 However, the view quickly
prevailed that the Restatement’s value lay in its elaboration
of topics in light of international law,35 which had flickered
but dimly in the awareness of protagonists in then recent
debates about NATO and the United States’ peace treaty
with Japan.36
In other words, the drafters of the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations sought not just to record or forecast the
views of U.S. decision-makers, but to change them by
introducing the global perspectives embodied in
international law. To that end, Council Draft No. 1 proposed
the following standard in February 1957:
32. ALI FOREIGN RELATIONS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 2.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1957) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1)]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (Council Draft No. 1, 1957)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Council Draft No.
1)].
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1),
supra note 33, at 1 (“Consideration was given to confining the proposed
Restatement to the second portion of the field, the domestic legal aspects of
foreign relations.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Council
Draft No. 1), supra note 33, at 1 (same); ALI FOREIGN RELATIONS PROJECT, supra
note 27, at 3 (“On first consideration, it would appear that the most pressing
need is for a study confined to the domestic aspects of foreign relations.”).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1),
supra note 33, at 1-2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Council
Draft No. 1), supra note 33, at 1-2; ALI FOREIGN RELATIONS PROJECT, supra note
27, at 4.
36. ALI FOREIGN RELATIONS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 4-5; see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 33, at 2;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Council Draft No. 1), supra note
33, at 2.
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When the term “international law” is used in this proposed
Restatement, to describe a rule, therefore, it is meant to express
the views of the Reportorial staff, and later, it is hoped, the
American Law Institute as to the rule which would be applied by
an international tribunal, such as the International Court of
37
Justice if the matter were to come before it.

Two months later, the ALI adopted this perspective as
its official drafting standard, which endured through
adoption of the final draft in 1965:
[T]he positions or outlooks of particular states, including the
United States, should not be confused with what a consensus of
states would accept or support. Thus the Restatement of this
Subject, in stating the rules of international law, represents the
opinion of The American Law Institute as to the rules that an
international tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a
38
controversy in accordance with international law.

To get a sense of how the adoption of global perspectives
can affect legal analysis, one need only consider the views of
a Justice Department lawyer familiar with the Restatement
process:
We start by recognizing that there is a difference in how these
questions are treated by domestic and by international tribunals.
If state A were to argue with state B that a treaty is no longer in
force because it has been superseded by customary law, one would
look to the law of treaties for an answer and presumably try to
guess how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would rule on
the question . . . .
Suppose a U.S. citizen argues in a U.S. court that a treaty is no
longer in force because it has been superseded. The approach of a
domestic court is far different. The court would listen for about
four minutes and inquire as to whether the treaty is still

37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Council Draft No. 1),
supra note 33, at 4 (emphasis added).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 18, at XII; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1),
supra note 33, at 4 (“When the term ‘international law’ is used in this
Restatement to describe a rule, therefore, it is meant to express the rule which
would be applied by an international tribunal, if the matter were to come before
it . . . .”).
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considered by the executive to be in force for the United States; if
39
the answer is yes, that would settle the matter.

While the same lawyer criticized the adoption of global
perspectives as likely to produce confusion about the likely
outcome of litigation in U.S. courts,40 experience
demonstrated the value of adopting a single normative
starting point for consideration of all provisions. According
to Monroe Leigh, a member of the advisory committee from
1958 to 1965,41 the existence of a “definite standard
throughout [the] formulation” of the Restatement
represented an “extremely important” contribution because
it meant that reporters and ALI members were “constantly
testing” provisions against a fixed yardstick, which brought
focus, consistency, and discipline to the drafting process.42
B. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States
As a counterpoint, one may refer to the drafting of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which began in
197743 and continued for several years without any formal

39. 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 31, at 76 (Goldklang Remarks); cf.
Sebastian Perry, A Man with Many Hats, GLOBAL ARB. REV., May 10, 2012, at
28, 30 [hereinafter Perry, A Man with Many Hats] (quoting George Bermann)
(“At the same time as doing the restatement, I’ve been working with Emmanuel
Gaillard under the auspices of UNCITRAL to compose an article-by-article
guide to the New York Convention. So at the same time I’m striving to arrive at
an authoritative view of the convention before US courts, I’m trying to formulate
a best ‘international’ interpretation of the same instrument. There are several
issues on which the two perspectives are substantially at variance . . . .”).
40. See 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 31, at 77 (Goldklang Remarks)
(“The answers [likely to be provided by U.S. courts] are clear. We ought to be
able find them in the new Restatement, not the confusion that now exists.”).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, at v (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1958) (listing members of the
advisory committee); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
18, at iv (same).
42. 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 190-91 (remarks by Monroe
Leigh).
43. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED REVISION AND EXPANSION OF THE
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1977).
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drafting standard at all.44 During that time, the project took
a number of unexpected turns, including a sharp reduction
44. See 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 190-91 (remarks by
Monroe Leigh) (observing that early drafts “contain no comparable statement of
a standard.”). During the ALI’s annual meeting in 1982, Leigh pressed the chief
reporter, Louis Henkin, for an articulation of the normative standard
underlying work on the Restatement:
MR. MONROE LEIGH (D.C.): Mr. Chairman, my observations are
really to elicit from the Reporter a statement of what it is we consider
foreign relations law of the United States to be. This applies generally
to everything we do in this Restatement . . . .
I understand that the standard in the old Restatement was that what
we put in black letter and elsewhere in fact in the Commentary and in
the Reporters’ Notes constituted the judgment of the Institute . . . as to
how an international tribunal—not just the International Court of
Justice, but an international tribunal—would rule on the issue. So, my
first question is: Am I right in assuming that continues to be one aspect
of what we are doing here?
PROFESSOR HENKIN: Yes.
59 A.L.I. PROC. 188, 201 (1982). However, later at the same meeting, one of the
associate reporters noted the existence of “different views about what the
Restatement ought to do”:
PROFESSOR VAGTS: . . . Our primary lodestar was correctly stated by
Mr. Monroe Leigh and that is an attempt to predict what an
international tribunal would decide. We are urged to state and we try
to reflect what the Institute would think would be the best rule. When
this discussion came up in 1961, Mr. Buchanan said that we should
raise the standard to which a wise and honest nation would repair. And
that is certainly a worthy objective. Third, the Restatement should
guide or at least not mislead judges and practitioners as to what is
happening there, rather inconsistent with the first. Fourth, the
Restatement should be part of a dialogue with foreign lawyers, foreign
courts, and foreign authorities, an attempt with reasonable, persuasive
arguments to have them recognize and understand our positions. Fifth,
it is urged upon us that we should parallel State Department policy,
and we have been criticized for doing so grudgingly, and that is a
problem.
Id. at 233-34. Given the multitude of perspectives informing the debate on
controversial topics, Leigh probably felt disappointed by the fact that the
reporters and, thus, the ALI did not even mention drafting standards in written
work product until 1984, when the reporters submitted what they expected to be
the last tranche of new material. 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at
190-91 (remarks by Monroe Leigh) (criticizing the omission of any written
reference of drafting standards until 1984); 61 A.L.I. P ROC. 35, 59 (1984)
(statement by Louis Henkin) (introducing Tentative Draft No. 5 and stating that
“it is essentially our last submission of new material . . . essentially that will
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in the black letter treatment of expropriation,45 the
introduction of a laudable but factually unsupported
complete any new material we have to offer you.”). In any event, the formulation
of the drafting standard clearly disturbed Leigh inasmuch as it merely quoted,
without endorsement, the position taken by the previous Restatement:
In respect of customary law, created by the general practice of states,
as the Reporters of the previous Restatement said . . . : “[T]he positions
or outlooks of particular states, including the United States, should not
be confused with what a consensus of states would accept or support.
Thus, the Restatement of this Subject, in stating rules of international
law, represents the opinion of The American Law Institute as to the
rules that an international tribunal would apply if charged with
deciding a controversy in accordance with international law.” Of course,
a determination of international law, or an interpretation of a U.S.
treaty, by the Supreme Court of the United States is authoritative
foreign relations law of the United States.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1984) (citation omitted); see also 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC., supra note 18, at 191 (remarks by Monroe Leigh) (“When a standard was
first laid before the ALI’s annual meeting, however, which was not until 1984 . .
. the result was disappointing. The present Reporters merely quoted from the
early Reporters’ preface, significantly without any personal endorsement . . . .”).
One might add that the juxtaposition of an ambiguous reference to the previous
Restatement’s standard against a statement recognizing the authoritative
character of Supreme Court decisions created substantial room for confusion
about whether the Reporters had adopted a global or a domestic perspective, or
intentionally created the leeway to shift perspectives as needed. See 61 A.L.I.
PROC., supra at 62-63 (statement by Professor Auerbach) (asking if the views of
the Supreme Court “will be determinative for us” even if inconsistent with
“what an international tribunal might decide,” and confirmed “[t]hat’s right” by
Professor Louis Henkin); id. at 64 (statement by Professor Louis Henkin) (“The
courts of the United States will decide what the international law is and they
will look to authoritative international bodies.”); id. at 66 (statement by Monroe
Leigh) (questioning if “the Institute is clearly on record as operating against the
same standard in this Restatement as it did in the earlier Restatement,” and
confirmed by Professor Louis Henkin).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 712.
Whereas the Restatement (Third) dealt with the issue of expropriation in one
section, its predecessor’s treatment of the topic had covered thirteen sections. Id.
§ 712 reporters’ note 13; 76 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 27, at 197
(remarks by John Houck); see also 62 A.L.I. PROC. at 531 (1985) (statement by
Professor Louis Henkin) (“There are lots of things in black letter [in the previous
Restatement] that aren’t in black letter here . . . .”). In the view of many
observers, the resulting compression “appeared to water down the traditional
view of the United States” at a time when communist and newly independent
states were calling for a New International Economic Order. 76 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC., supra note 27, at 198 (remarks by John Houck); see also 76 AM. SOC’Y
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obligation of reasonableness in the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction,46 and the designation of custom as federal law
INT’L L. PROC., supra note 27, at 200 (remarks by Brice Clagett) (describing § 712
as “an unwarranted retreat from established and still valid principles of law as
to expropriations” and objecting to the Restatement’s “heavy reliance on General
Assembly resolutions”); see also 62 A.L.I. PROC. at 511 (1985) (quoting Davis
Robinson) (recognizing that the “overall structure and presentation” of the
previous Restatement “was stronger than the present Section 712”); id. at 522
(statement by Nicholas R. Doman) (“We should not abandon . . . the old
American doctrine of full, adequate, in fact, even prompt compensation.”); id. at
524-25 (statement by Professor Myres Smith McDougal) (“[T]here is no reason
on God’s earth why we should formulate the law in a way to protect the people
that are trying to take the assets of our nationals.”); id. at 531-32 (statement by
Mark B. Feldman) (“I am deeply concerned . . . this Institute will be taking a
step backwards now, a very significant, substantive step backwards, from the
position of the Institute in the last Restatement, and in a context where
investment is more insecure . . . .”).
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 403
(requiring moderation in the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction). In the years
running up to adoption of the Restatement, frictions arose between the United
States and European trading partners regarding the United States’ so-called
“exorbitant” exercise of jurisdiction over European companies based on economic
effects in the United States. See id. § 403 reporters’ note 1; id. pt. IV
introductory note, at 236 (“Attempts by some states—notably the United
States—to apply their law on the basis of very broad conceptions of territoriality
or nationality bred resentment and brought forth conflicting assertions of the
rules of international law.”).
While some U.S. courts had attempted to moderate the exercise of jurisdiction
through discretionary principles like comity, the Restatement sought to reduce
tensions even further by requiring moderation as a matter of law. See id. § 403
cmt. a & reporters’ notes 2-3; see also 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18,
at 188 (remarks by Cecil Olmstead) (indicating that § 403 “serves as a brake” on
the exercise of jurisdiction, which brings the Restatement’s provisions on
jurisdiction back “down to earth”).
Many observers regard this as an area where the Restatement went well beyond
U.S. and international law. See id. (lauding the principles set forth in § 403, but
questioning the depth of their roots in international and U.S. law); 81 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 192-93 (remarks by Monroe Leigh) (indicating
that the reporters “have been a bit too prone, perhaps we can say to willful to
finding new customary international law”; citing § 403 as an example; and
opining that neither international nor domestic jurisprudence supported the
position taken by that provision); see also Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14
YALE J. INT’L L. 468, 472 (1989); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and
International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53,
53-55 (1995); David B. Massey, Note, How the American Law Institute Influences
Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419, 420-21 (1997); 62 A.L.I. PROC., supra note
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on the same level as statutes and treaties.47 As a
consequence of the last-mentioned phenomenon, early
drafts of the Restatement took the rather surprising
position that judicial recognition of new customs could
invalidate prior statutes and treaties,48 as well as executive
acts.49 Faced with these developments, and deteriorating
45, at 407 (1985) (statement by Professor Karl Meessen); id. at 410, 412
(statement by Professor Don Wallace, Jr.); id. at 422 (statement by Professor
Robert Armstrong Anthony); id. at 425 (statement by Professor Myres Smith
McDougal); id. at 427-28, (statement by Professor Richard W. Jennings); id. at
431-32 (statement by Mr. David Small).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 135 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1)]; 76 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC., supra note 27, at 189 (remarks by Louis Henkin) (“I have always thought
that customary law, as law of the United States, is like any other . . . federal law
[and] . . . is equal to other federal law. Just as a statute is equal to a treaty so
that the later in time prevails, so customary law is equal to a treaty, is equal to
a statute, and the latest in time prevails. That would make it possible, in theory,
for customary law to develop and be given effect although it is inconsistent with
some earlier statute.”); see also 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 31, at 74
(remarks of Jack Goldklang).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1),
supra note 47, § 135 cmt. b; see also 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18,
at 193 (remarks by Monroe Leigh) (criticizing the “startling” position taken by
the Restatement). To be sure, the drafters of the Restatement recognized that
Congress could, in turn, override judicial determinations of custom by enacting
contrary statutes. 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 31, at 94 (discussing
Louis Henkin’s remarks and opining that “it was an issue of who had the last
word,” and observing that “if Congress did not like a given principle of
customary law, it could ‘repeal’ it for purposes of domestic law”). However, the
process for securing majorities in both houses of Congress, as well as
presidential approval, represents a difficult task under any circumstances—
especially given the Restatement’s view that incompatibility with custom
justifies the President’s decision to veto such laws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 115 cmt. a. In a period of divided
government, the difficulty of building the required majorities in both houses
increases exponentially. See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and
Customary International Law: The Intellectual Origins of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 33,
56 (2003) (opining that “the idea of any significant constraint on judicial
innovation getting past the solidly Democratic House of Representatives would
have seemed, in both 1980 and 1982, implausible”).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1),
supra note 47, § 132 reporters’ note 1; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 112 reporters’ note 1. While observing that customary
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relations between U.S. officials and the reporters,50 the
Acting Secretary of State and the Attorney General
personally requested the ALI to give everyone the
equivalent of a time-out by delaying adoption of the
Restatement for one year as of 1985.51

international law represents federal law and that the President generally has a
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law, the reporters also recognized
that the President has the power to disregard rules of customary international
law “when acting within his constitutional power.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 47, § 135 reporters’ note
5; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 111 cmt.
c. In its final form, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations criticized a
lower court for upholding the Attorney General’s right to violate customary
norms against arbitrary detention without analysis of the specific constitutional
powers being exercised. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 4, § 115 reporters’ note 3. While recognizing that the President has a
degree of constitutional authority to disregard customary international law, one
distinguished observer explained that such authority applies only when the
President exercises his constitutional prerogatives to conduct foreign affairs. 79
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 31, at 86-87 (remarks by Oscar Schachter).
In his view, arbitrary detention of individuals (citizen or alien) would not
involve foreign relations. Id. at 89. In addition, while the President has wideranging powers in the sphere of foreign affairs, a distinguished federal judge
once recognized that “not every issue related to foreign relations is
constitutionally committed for resolution by the Executive.” Id. (quoting Judge
Malcolm Wilkey).
50. See 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 181-82 (remarks by
Harold G. Maier) (referring to the “unusually vituperative controversy that
accompanied the development, promulgation, and eventual adoption of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised),” including “the level of distrust
that had developed over the years between the Reporters and government
officials,” due in part to the fact that “those who were preparing the Restatement
saw a part of their mission as being to ‘set the government right’”).
51. 62 A.L.I. PROC., supra note 45, at 374 (statement by ALI President
Perkins) (“[W]e have been asked by the Acting Secretary of State and the
Attorney General to postpone final adoption of the Foreign Relations
Restatement for a year and to give them . . . opportunity for further review of
the text . . . . These requests emanate from the highest department levels and
are joined by other departments, including Treasury and Commerce.”); see also
81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 182 (remarks by Harold G. Maier)
(explaining that “[i]n May 1985, the ALI delayed final promulgation of the
document for a year to receive additional input from the branches of
government”); McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 311 n.3 (explaining that the “ALI
extended the Restatement (Third) project one year beyond its original schedule”
to consider criticisms offered by the U.S. government).
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During the ensuing period of consultations and review,
the ALI adopted a drafting standard, which claimed to
follow the “previous Restatement,” but then reformulated
its orientation to encompass “the rules that an impartial
tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy
in accordance with international law.”52 At the time,
observers attributed the new formulation to the fact that
the State Department had just lost the Nicaragua case and
no longer viewed the ICJ as impartial.53 In any event, the
final version of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations clarified that its standard referenced the
perspective of “disinterested tribunal[s], whether of the
United States or some other national state or an
international tribunal.”54
Without exaggeration, one may describe the history of
drafting standards for the 1987 Restatement as a failure.
According to Monroe Leigh, who also served as a member of
the advisory committee for the 1987 Restatement,55 the
absence of any definite yardstick for several critical years
created an atmosphere in which the reporters “felt free to
embellish the development of international law with . . .
their own personal preferences.”56 Furthermore, the written
standard that appeared in the final stages simply
perpetuated the lack of guidance, not merely because last

52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(emphasis added).

OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, intro. at 3

53. See 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 191 (remarks by Monroe
Leigh) (“I frankly do not know the exact reasons as to why it was changed. If it
was changed because the State Department had strong feelings about the
results of its litigation with Nicaragua in the ICJ, that was in my opinion an
unfortunate overreaction to the case.”); 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note
18, at 196 (statement by Professor Vagts) (“Should we consider the ICJ an
impartial tribunal? Well, The Legal Adviser has in effect said no; this is the long
and short of it.”).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, at XI.
55. Id. at V.
56. See 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 18, at 191 (remarks by Monroe
Leigh); see also id. at 192 (indicating that the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations “operated without a firmly declared standard” until
the end of the drafting process).

748

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

minute changes carry the potential to sow confusion. 57 Even
worse, the written “standard” merely identified the
perspectives of domestic, foreign, and international
tribunals as the three potential yardsticks without
expressing any preference,58 thereby leaving the reporters
with complete freedom of navigation.
III. DRAFT RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
MORE DOMESTIC THAN INTERNATIONAL
Turning to the Draft Restatement on International
Commercial Arbitration, one should pause to emphasize
that the project shows relatively few signs of weakness with
respect to focus, consistency, and discipline despite the
absence of formal drafting standards. Under the
circumstances, one might reasonably ask whether drafting
standards seem necessary for a project generally lauded
within the arbitration community. In the author’s view,
there are at least two strong reasons for adopting drafting
standards. First, as an organization dedicated to
clarification and improvement of the law, 59 the ALI should
be able to formulate a position on the central challenges
facing one of its most eagerly awaited projects.60 Second,
57. Id. at 191 (“It is procedurally unwise and undesirable to make such a late
change because it is like changing the length of the yardstick against which
things are tested.”).
58. See supra note 44 (setting forth the text of the drafting “standard”
adopted by the ALI in Tentative Draft No. 5, 1984).
59. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the ALI’s
mandate with respect to clarification and improvement of the law).
60. 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra note 31, at 73 (remarks by Jack
Goldklang) (“It is fair to begin by asking what philosophy underlies a work as
significant as the Restatement . . . .”). But see Sebastian Perry, Atlanta:
Restating the Obvious?, GLOBAL ARB. REV., May 10, 2012, at 39, 40 [hereinafter
Perry, Atlanta] (quoting chief reporter George Bermann) (“It is unrealistic to
expect that we should have some kind of fixed philosophy as to how every
particular issue that comes across the transom will be dealt with.”).
Interestingly, Professor Bermann has publicly stated that the Draft
Restatement is “not neutral.” Id. at 40. Given that observation, it seems
reasonable to expect the Draft Restatement to include some textual accounting
of the principles that govern its departures from neutrality.
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drafting standards can affect the reception of substantive
choices on controversial topics. To illustrate the point, one
may begin by identifying the divisive issue of interim
measures and, then, explaining how drafting standards
could have been more effective in bringing the protagonists
to equilibrium.
A. “Navigating” the Legal Status of Interim Measures
One of the earliest challenges faced by the reporters of
the Draft Restatement involved the legal status of interim
measures, or temporary remedies ordered by arbitral
tribunals, which might include preliminary injunctions,
directions to pay sums into escrow, or directions to sell
perishable goods.61 Without question, the proper designation
of interim measures represents a thorny topic dominated by
the opposing forces of logic and practical imperative.
Logically, if one starts from the proposition that awards
represent a final determination of the merits regarding at
least one aspect of a dispute,62 interim measures cannot

61. This issue caused the drafters to shift positions more than once. Compare
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1(a), (p) &
cmts. a, p & reporters’ notes a, p (Council Draft No. 1, 2009) [hereinafter DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 1)] (defining arbitral awards to include interim
measures granted by tribunals), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1(a), (p) & cmts. a, p & reporters’ notes a, p
(Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2010) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary
Draft No. 3)] (defining arbitral awards, including partial awards, to exclude
interim measures granted by tribunals), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1(a), (p) & cmts. a, p & reporters’
notes a, p (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 1)] (emphatically classifying interim measures as awards).
See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 1-1 reporters’
note a (recognizing that the proper classification of interim measures as awards
or not as awards “raises challenging questions”).
62. See RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 1-1 (a) (“An
‘arbitral award’ is a decision in writing by an arbitral tribunal that sets forth
the final and binding determination on the merits of a claim, defense, or issue,
regardless of whether that decision resolves the entire controversy before the
tribunal.”); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2815 (2009)
(“In order for an arbitral award to be recognized under contemporary
international arbitration conventions and arbitration legislation, it generally
must have achieved some degree of ‘finality’ or must be sufficiently ‘binding.’”);
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qualify as awards because they represent temporary
measures, subject to modification or withdrawal by the
tribunal at any stage.63 By contrast, if one starts from the
MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 179 (2008) (“Parties generally expect an arbitration to
result in an award that will be final and binding.”); see also NIGEL BLACKABY ET
AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 516 (5th ed. 2009) (“In
practice, the term ‘award’ should be reserved for decisions that finally determine
the substantive issues with which they deal.”); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 631 (2003) (“Any
decision which finally resolves a substantive issue affecting the rights and
obligations of the parties is an award.”).
In the context of defining awards, “final” means final with respect to parties and
the tribunal in the sense that the decision becomes res judicata and, therefore,
no longer subject to revision by the tribunal. Compare LEW ET AL., supra at 631
(“An award[] concludes the dispute as to the specific issue determined in the
award so that it has res judicata effect between the parties . . . .”), with ANDREW
TWEEDDALE & KEREN TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES:
INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE 332 (2005) (“All awards are by
their nature final. Once an award is made, . . . the arbitral tribunal has no
jurisdiction to review that decision . . . . [T]he effect of finality is that the
arbitral tribunal no longer has jurisdiction to review an earlier award.”), and
DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON & JUDITH GILL, RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 235 (22d ed.
2003) (“The tribunal does not have power either to reopen its award at some
later stage of the reference, or to make a subsequent determination of issues
previously disposed of in an interim award. . . . Any adjudication in a later
award on an issue already disposed of in an earlier award is therefore outside
the tribunal’s jurisdiction and void.”).
63. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note of the Secretariat on the Possible
Future Work in the Area of International Commercial Arbitration, ¶ 121, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/460 (Apr. 6, 1999) (“The prevailing view, confirmed also by case law
in some States, appears to be that the Convention does not apply to interim
awards” granting interim measures of protection); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note
62, at 446 (observing that “interim measures ordered by an arbitral tribunal do
not, by definition, finally resolve any point in dispute” and, therefore seem
“unlikely to satisfy the requirement of finality under the New York
Convention”); LEW ET AL., supra note 62, at 635 (describing the “prevailing
position” to be that interim measures granted by tribunals do not qualify as
awards capable of enforcement under the New York Convention); MOSES, supra
note 62, at 182 (“A decision designated as an ‘interim award,’ dealing with
interim relief, is generally not considered a final award enforceable under the
New York Convention.”); TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 62, at 309 (“The
New York Convention refers only to the enforcement of an award. On its face,
therefore, it would appear than an order for an interim measure of protection
cannot be enforced under the New York Convention.”); Resort Condominiums
Int’l, Inc. (USA) v. Bolwell (Queensland S. Ct. 1993), XX Y.B. COM. ARB. 628,
642 (1995) (indicating that “the award which may be enforced must be an award
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proposition that interim measures serve to prevent
irreparable harm,64 one quickly understands the practical
imperatives that motivate efforts to designate them as
awards capable of summary, worldwide enforcement under
the New York Convention.65
which is final and binding on the parties[;] [a]n interlocutory order which may
be rescinded, suspended, varied or reopened by the tribunal which pronounced
it, is not ‘final’ and binding on the parties”); see also BLACKABY ET AL., supra note
62, at 516 n.11 (suggesting that “any decision that is not finally determinative of
the issues with which it deals should not be called an ‘award.’”); W. LAURENCE
CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 464 (3d ed.
2000) (“[W]hile the tribunal no doubt intends to bind the parties with its
decision, it is hard to conceive of the decision as finally disposing of a dispute
between the parties.”).
64. See BORN, supra note 62, at 1981 (indicating that “most international
arbitral tribunals require showings of (a) serious or irreparable harm to the
claimant; (b) urgency; and (c) no prejudgment of the merits . . .”); LEW ET AL.,
supra note 62, at 604 (identifying “two widely agreed substantive requirements
for the granting of interim relief by arbitration tribunals: no pre-judgment of the
case, and the threat of irreparable or substantial harm which cannot be
compensated for by damages.”); TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 62, at 299
(describing the objectives of “[c]onservatory measures,” including the prevention
of irreparable harm, maintenance of the status quo, and preservation of
evidence or assets). See also U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, ¶ 17A(1)(a), G.A. Res 61/33, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 4, 2006), [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf
(listing irreparable harm as one of the conditions for granting interim
measures).
65. One prominent member of the arbitration bar offers the following
justification for classifying interim measures as awards:
The better view is that provisional measures should be and are
enforceable as arbitral awards under generally-applicable provisions for
the recognition and enforcement of awards. Provisional measures are
“final” in the sense that they dispose of a request for relief pending the
conclusion of the arbitration. . . . It is also highly important to the
efficacy of the arbitral process for national courts to be able to enforce
provisional measures. If this possibility does not exist, then parties will
be able and significantly more willing to refuse to comply with
provisional relief, resulting in precisely the serious harm that
provisional measures were meant to foreclose.
BORN, supra note 62, at 2023 (emphasis added). While compelling from the
perspective of practical imperative, Mr. Born’s definition of finality seems
unusually elastic. In any case, it bears emphasis that even under Mr. Born’s
analysis, interim measures have the required finality only if intended to remain
in effect until completion of the arbitral process. Id. To the extent that the
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To resolve these and other controversies, the reporters
have not always followed the majority views of U.S. courts,
arguing that the Draft Restatement does not represent a
“popularity contest.”66 Instead, the chief reporter has
described the drafting process as an exercise in
“navigation,”67 during which the reporters “are prepared to
listen, navigate, and change course”68 in response to the
views expressed during consultations with various groups of
ALI stakeholders. One wonders whether that process of
navigating in response to feedback incorporates the main
elements of a popularity contest.69 However, the point is
that this form of “navigation” relies more on shifting winds
than adherence to a deliberately charted course.
As a result of the “non-dogmatic” and “non-linear”
approach just described,70 the evolution of the Draft

tribunal retains discretion to modify interim measures before completion of the
proceedings, they would not qualify as awards even under Mr. Born’s reasoning.
See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 64, art. 17D (recognizing that arbitral
tribunals “may modify, suspend or terminate an interim measure . . . it has
granted, upon application of any party or, in exceptional circumstances and
upon prior notice to the parties, on the arbitral tribunal’s own initiative.”).
66. See Perry, A Man with Many Hats, supra note 39, at 30 (quoting George
Bermann) (asserting that “[a] restatement need not reflect the existing or
dominant view on every last issue . . .”); see also Charles H. Brower II, Fault
Lines in International Commercial Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/02/21/fault-lines-ininternational-commercial-arbitration/ (explaining that the reporters have
rejected the clearly dominant line of U.S. authority regarding the grounds for
vacatur of U.S. convention awards, due at least in part to their view that “the
Restatement is not a popularity contest”).
67. See Perry, A Man with Many Hats, supra note 39, at 30 (quoting George
Bermann) (“The only word to describe the exercise is ‘navigation.’”).
68. See Perry, Atlanta, supra note 60 (quoting George Bermann) (“We don’t
take mandates from special interests but we are prepared to listen, navigate
and change course.”).
69. See Brower, supra note 66 (discussing the possibility of determining the
Draft Restatement’s content by tallying the comments of advisors and the
members consultative group, but implying that such an approach would
“represent[] a different kind of popularity contest”).
70. Perry, Atlanta, supra note 60, at 40 (quoting George Bermann)
(“Summing up, Bermann defended the reporters’ approach as ‘non-dogmatic’
and said he doubted the ALI would wish them to have an ‘a priori view’ of the
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Restatement’s position on interim measures reflects a high
degree of instability. In 2009, Council Draft No. 1 expressed
the view that “certain kinds” of interim relief “may” qualify
as awards.71 In 2010, Preliminary Draft No. 3 defined
awards and partial awards to exclude interim measures,72
which represents the prevailing view of observers and
foreign jurisdictions.73 Later that same year, Tentative
Draft No. 1 reversed course with a blanket assertion that
interim measures “constitute” awards that “must” be
enforced under the New York and Panama Conventions.74
By the end of 2011, Council Draft No. 3 shifted positions
issues. . . . ‘I’m not at all disturbed that we have proceeded in a non-linear
fashion . . . .’”) (emphasis added).
71. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 1(a)
(asserting that an award “may consist of a grant of interim relief”); id. § 1(p)
(asserting that partial awards “may consist in whole or in part of an award of
interim relief”); id. cmt. a (opining that the definition of awards is “broad
enough . . . to include grants of certain kinds of interim or provisional relief”).
72. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 3), supra note 61, § 1(v)
(asserting that a “partial award does not include an interim measure”); id. cmt.
a (“A grant of interim measures by an arbitral tribunal ordinarily does not
constitute an award, inasmuch as such measures, by definition, do not set forth
a ‘final and conclusive determination on the merits of a claim, defense, or
issue.’”); id. cmt. p (“Measures of interim relief do not constitute awards . . . .”);
id. reporters’ note a (“[A]rbitral grants of interim relief do not constitute awards
because they are generally intended to remain in effect only during the
pendency of the arbitration and are typically subject to revision or withdrawal
by the tribunal. They cannot therefore be readily viewed as disposing of issues
finally and conclusively. The freedom that tribunals have to revisit interim
measures prior to issuance of the final award makes it difficult to characterize
them as awards.”).
73. See supra note 63; see also DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 3),
supra note 61, § 1 reporters’ note a (“The Restatement view is . . . well supported
in the literature . . . . It is also supported by foreign and domestic case law.”).
74. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 61, §1-1(p) (“For
purposes of this Restatement, an interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal
constitutes an award.”). The Draft Restatement amplifies this point in the
official commentary:
[A] grant of interim measures by an arbitral tribunal constitutes an
award inasmuch as such measures set forth a “final and binding
determination” as to whether on the facts presented to the tribunal the
requesting party is entitled to temporary relief. Accordingly, orders of
interim measures must be recognized or enforced as an arbitral award.
Id. § 1-1 cmt. a.
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again, retreating to the view that interim measures
“presumptively” constitute partial awards.75
As demonstrated by the Draft Restatement’s shifting
positions on interim measures, the problem with
“navigation” based on the preferences of ALI stakeholders is
that all participants have personal reference points, except
perhaps the reporters themselves.76 In the author’s
experience, the practitioners who dominate such encounters
(1) systematically favor positions that maximize
enforcement of tribunal decisions, and (2) see the
Restatement as a Trojan horse that can slip the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Model Law into U.S. practice,77 at the national

75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 1-1(q) (Council Draft No. 3, 2011) [hereinafter DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3)].
76. See Perry, Atlanta, supra note 60 (quoting George Bermann) (“Bermann
said the reporters were governed by no other ‘personal preference’ than the
desire ‘to make [U.S.] arbitration law coherent and user-friendly.’”). But see id.
(“On the other hand, the project is ‘not neutral’ . . .”).
77. In this regard, one must bear in mind that the drafters of the
Restatement falsely suggest that their work goes only as far as the UNCITRAL
Model Law in defining awards to include interim measures. See DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 1-1 reporters’ note p (“As
under the Model Law, interim measures issued by an arbitral tribunal are
considered as constituting an award.”).
To the contrary, since the amendments of 2006, the UNCITRAL Model Law
establishes parallel and largely congruent enforcement mechanisms for interim
measures and awards. Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 64, art.
17H (“[r]ecognition and enforcement” of interim measures), and art. 17I
(“[g]rounds for refusing recognition or enforcement” of interim measures), with
art. 35 (“[r]ecognition and enforcement” of awards), and art. 36 (“[g]rounds for
refusing recognition or enforcement” of awards). Despite the general congruity,
the enforcement mechanism for interim measures introduces certain
refinements designed to recognize that interim measures place the parties, the
tribunal, and courts into ongoing relationships having different qualities than
the relationships established by awards. At an early stage, the SecretaryGeneral of UNCITRAL emphasized that interim measures of protection differ
from arbitral awards “in some important respects.” U.N. Secretary-General,
Settlement of Commercial Disputes, TP 82, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108
(Jan. 14, 2000). These differences include the temporary nature of interim relief,
the tribunal’s power to modify interim relief “as matters evolve during the
arbitral proceedings,” and the possibility of ex parte relief. Id. ¶¶ 66-67, 82, 100.
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level,78 without the need for action by a reluctant and,
perhaps, hostile Congress.79 As a general matter, the author
In addition, tribunals might award forms of interim relief unknown or
unavailable in the courts of enforcing states. Id. ¶ 96.
To control for the differences between interim measures and awards, the
Secretary-General called for “special provisions on the enforcement of interim
measures.” Id. ¶ 100. Consistent with that admonition, the provisions on
enforcement of interim measures added to the UNCITRAL Model Law as of
2006 include: (1) a requirement that the party who seeks or obtains an interim
measure must promptly inform the court if the tribunal terminates, suspends or
modifies that measure; (2) a ground for refusing to enforce interim measures
terminated or suspended by the tribunal; and (3) a ground for refusing to
enforce interim measures that are “incompatible with the powers conferred
upon the court.” See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 64, arts. 17H(2),
17I(1)(a)(iii), 17I(b)(i).
In addition, the 2006 revisions contemplate the possibility of ex parte relief in
the form of a “preliminary order” that expires in twenty days and is not subject
to judicial enforcement. Id. arts. 17B-17C.
78. A few states of the United States have adopted the UNCITRAL Model
Law, but only Florida has adopted the 2006 revisions relating to interim
measures. See FLA. STAT. §§ 684.0018-684.0027 (2010); U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L
TRADE LAW, Status 1985-UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration,
with
amendments
as
adopted
in
2006,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitr
ation_status.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2013).
79. See Perry, A Man with Many Hats, supra note 39, at 30 (quoting George
Bermann) (“Crucially, a restatement doesn’t have to be voted on by Congress.”);
see also id. (“Of course, it would be better to have a good federal statute rather
than a restatement . . . but I don’t see that happening anytime soon. . . . More
and more young lawyers may be finding arbitration very attractive
professionally . . . but that doesn’t mean Congress regards [Federal Arbitration
Act] reform on the same level as ‘Obamacare,’ legalizing marijuana, or
immigration reform.”). In assessing the legitimacy of seeking legal reform
without Congressional approval, one should bear in mind that the drafters of
the Restatement began their work in the shadow of a Congress that seemed to
teeter on the brink of hostility toward arbitration, including international
arbitration. See, e.g., Alicia J. Surdyk, Note, On the Continued Vitality of
Securities Arbitration: Why Reform Efforts Must Not Preclude Predispute
Arbitration Clauses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (2009/10) (quoting the
2007 congressional testimony of a Senior Vice President of the American
Arbitration Association, who complained that the draft Arbitration Fairness Act
would “unnecessarily send a message of ambiguity and policy hostility to
arbitration to the international . . . community”); see also Edna Sussman, The
Unintended Consequences of the Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, FED. LAW.,
May 2009, at 48, 51 (warning that “if the Arbitration Fairness Act as drafted
becomes law, the United States will no longer be viewed as a friendly forum for
international arbitration”).
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tends to resist such efforts on principle because they seem
to advance the self-interest of the arbitration bar while
evading the normal channels of legal reform.80 Turning to
the level of doctrine, the author also prefers a more nuanced
approach that mirrors the diversity of interim measures.
Thus, while one must recognize that some interim measures
(like orders to sell perishable goods) are final and constitute
awards,81 others (like temporary restraining orders) are not
final and do not constitute awards.82
To the extent that one values party autonomy, selection
of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules might justify the
treatment of interim measures as awards, inasmuch as
those rules expressly provide that “interim measures may
be established in the form of an interim award.”83 By
contrast, the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA) Arbitration Rules merely authorize tribunals to
“order on a provisional basis, subject to final determination
in an award, any relief which the [a]rbitral [t]ribunal would
80. See Perry, Atlanta, supra note 60, at 39 (quoting Charles H. Brower II).
81. It seems obvious that an order to sell perishable goods would be final in
the sense that it could not be undone. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law,
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26(1) (1976), [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Arbitration
Rules
(1976)],
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (“At
the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may take any interim measures
it deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute, including
measures for the conservation of the goods forming the subject-matter in
dispute, such as ordering . . . the sale of perishable goods.”); id. art. 26(2)
(providing that “interim measures may be established in the form of an interim
award”).
82. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
83. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 81, at art. 26(2). By contrast, it
seems significant that the 2010 revisions to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
both emphasize the temporary character of interim measures and drop any
reference to the possibility of providing such relief in the form of an award. See
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26(2)
(2010), [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010)], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rulesrevised-2010-e.pdf (defining interim measures as a “temporary measure”); id.
art. 26(5) (emphasizing that the tribunal “may modify, suspend or terminate an
interim measure it has granted, upon application of any party or, in exceptional
circumstances and upon prior notice to the parties, on the arbitral tribunal’s
own initiative”).
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have the power to grant in an award, including a
provisional order for the payment of money . . . .”84 As
described in the foregoing provision, the order seems so
carefully distinguished from the award, and the remedy
seems so obviously subject to final determination in a
subsequent award, that one could not reasonably describe
the interim measure as having the characteristics of an
award. In fact, so much depends on the nature of the
remedy, the content of the arbitration rules, and the intent
of the tribunal, that the author’s personal starting point
would be to exclude any presumptions regarding the proper
designation of interim measures.85
In any case, one can see how the reporters’ “navigation”
among the views of stakeholders can lead to a series of
irreconcilable drafts that waste time, create a sense of drift,
and emphasize expediency, all of which undermine the
normative foundation of the ALI’s work.
B. The Utility of Drafting Standards: Preliminary
Assessment of Domestic Perspectives
If one had approached the problem of interim measures
by formulating an appropriate drafting standard,
stakeholders would have to step back from personal
reference points and accept a shared set of objectives, with
the result that discussions would lead to a swifter
convergence of views. To illustrate the point, one may begin
with the reporters’ academic writings, which reflect a
tendency to emphasize U.S. perspectives,86 an orientation
84. The London Court of International Arbitration [LCIA], Arbitration Rules,
art. 25.1(c) (Jan 1. 1998), http://www.lcia.org//media/download.aspx?MediaId=74
(emphasis added).
85. See Perry, Atlanta, supra note 60, at 39 (quoting Charles H. Brower II).
This position largely coincides with the position taken by the reporters for the
Draft Restatement in Council Draft No. 1. See supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
86. In spring 2009, the four reporters confirmed their intent to produce a
“Restatement of the U.S. law of international arbitration,” which would not
entail systematic reliance on foreign or international sources in the drafting
process. Bermann et al. (PENN. ST.), supra note 6, at 1336 (emphasis added).
Later that same year, the chief reporter suggested, albeit less clearly, that the

758

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

that Professor Bermann describes as simply retracing “the
path charted by the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law.”87 Despite the inaccuracy of Professor Bermann’s
statement regarding the supposedly domestic orientation of
previous Restatements,88 an emphasis on domestic
perspectives makes sense for this Restatement, which aims
to increase predictability for commercial users by accurately
forecasting the development of jurisprudence by U.S.
courts.89 A domestic orientation also seems desirable for a
first-generation project that seeks to build credibility among
U.S. courts.90 Finally, a domestic orientation appropriately
limits the influence of thirty strong-willed advisers, who
represent a tight community of internationalists engaged in
a financially lucrative business,91 and whose perspectives
seem unlikely to track those of U.S. lawmakers and judges.92
If one places the legal status of interim measures in the
context of drafting standards that emphasize U.S. practice,
and if one demonstrates the existence of U.S. cases treating
interim measures as awards, it becomes easier to accept the
Draft Restatement’s most recent position on interim
measures because the justification shifts from stakeholder
preferences to definite principles that both (1) mirror

draft Restatement aimed to provide “a substantive United States law position
on an international law subject.” Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 183.
87. See Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 184.
88. See supra notes 35-40, 44, 54 and accompanying text.
89. See Bermann et al. (PENN. ST.), supra note 6, at 1342 (“To plan effectively,
. . . parties . . . need the law and judicial decisions that provide the framework
for the system to be conceptually accessible and predictable. Clarifying the U.S.
law of international arbitration will aid parties in this endeavor.”); see also
Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 185 (explaining that “[t]he central objective
of Restatements is to clarify and consolidate the law for understanding and
application by U.S. courts”).
90. See Kristen David Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo’s
Ministry of Justice?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 173, 203 (2007) (explaining that “it is
important for any law-reform organization . . . to establish its credibility with
relatively noncontroversial matters before taking on difficult questions of law
and policy”).
91. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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judicial behavior and (2) limit the intrusion of professional
bias.93
As it turns out, the reporters’ notes to Tentative Draft
No. 2 cite four U.S. cases that treat interim measures as
awards.94 In one sense, the notes tend to exaggerate the
weight and clarity of U.S. case law because (1) three
decisions come from a single jurisdiction,95 (2) only one
decision comes from an appellate court,96 (3) only one
decision purports to address the status of interim measures
under the New York or Panama Conventions,97 and (4) three
cases involved remedies likely to be final in the sense that
93. Cf. Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the
Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 440-41 (2004) (“[S]ome recent
criticism of the [American Law] Institute has centered on allegations that the
Restatements have been captured by special interest groups. In other words,
even setting aside the debate as to whether the Restatements should be
descriptive or normative, there is significant concern that the Restatements
have become politically biased. . . . Some courts have expressed a related
concern that the Restatement process has been dominated by a few powerful,
interested parties.”).
94. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 1-1 reporters’
notes a, q (citing Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Mgmt.
Corp., 935 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1991); Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut.
Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); S. Seas Navigation
Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 606 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Sperry Int’l
Trade, Inc. v. Gov’t of Isr., 532 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 689 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1982)).
95. Banco de Seguro del Estado, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 362; S. Seas Navigation
Ltd., 606 F. Supp. at 692; Sperry Int’l Trade, Inc., 532 F. Supp. at 901.
96. Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp., 935 F.2d at 1019.
97. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 368-70 (applying the
Inter-American (Panama) Convention and enforcing an interim order directing
one party to establish an irrevocable letter of credit). Interestingly, the
reporters’ notes give pinpoint cites for Banco de Seguros del Estado, but not for
the other cases from the Southern District of New York. See DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 1-1 reporters’ notes a, q.
One might attribute the lack of pinpoint cites to the fact that those cases, like
Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp., do not purport to apply the New York or Panama
Conventions, but the domestic provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act. Pac.
Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp., 935 F.2d at 1022-23; S. Seas Navigation Ltd., 606 F.
Supp. at 695; Sperry Int’l Trade, Inc., 532 F. Supp. at 905. Perhaps for that
reason, the court in Banco de Seguros del Estado regarded the proper
classification of interim measures under the Panama Convention as a question
of first impression. See Banco de Seguros del Estado, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
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they involved low probabilities of alteration by the tribunal
pending the final award.98 Given these limitations, the cases
probably would not sustain the blanket statement found in
Tentative Draft No. 1 that interim measures “constitute”
awards, which courts “must” enforce as a matter of
international law.99 However, while lacking clarity and
uniformity in some respects, all four cases cited in the
reporters’ notes emphasize that the failure to enforce
interim measures as awards would render them
meaningless and, thus, destroy the integrity of the arbitral
process.100 This concordant emphasis on practical imperative
reasonably supports a presumption that other U.S. courts
would feel similarly motivated to treat interim measures as
awards, at least in analogous circumstances.
In short, when one shifts from stakeholder
preferences,101 to the more closely defined arena of U.S.
98. See Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp., 935 F.2d at 1022-23 (involving a
direction that one party establish an escrow account, which the tribunal
described as an “Interim Final Order” and which essentially segregated assets
for the duration of the proceeding) (emphasis added); Banco de Seguros del
Estado, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 364, 366, 368-70 (quoting Metallgesellschaft A.G. v.
M/V Capitan Constante, 790 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1986)) (involving a direction
that one party establish an “irrevocable” letter of credit, which “‘finally and
conclusively dispose[d]’ of [a] severable claim”); Sperry Int’l Trade, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. at 908-09 (involving a direction that both parties establish a joint escrow
account, which the tribunal specifically designated as an “Award” ripe for
“confirmation and/or enforcement” by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and which the court described as a “Solomonic
resolution . . . to take the money from both parties”). Tribunals are not likely to
alter such measures. See BORN, supra note 62, at 2023 (opining that “these sorts
of alterations seldom occur”). As noted above, interim measures that cannot be
undone possess the finality required to qualify as awards. See supra note 81 and
accompanying text. According to Mr. Born, the same principle applies to interim
measures that the tribunal intends to keep in place “pending the conclusion of
the arbitration.” See supra note 65.
99. See supra notes 61, 74 and accompanying text.
100. See Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp., 935 F.2d at 1023; Banco de Seguros
del Estado, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 369; S. Seas Navigation Ltd., 606 F. Supp. at 694;
Sperry Int’l Trade, Inc., 532 F. Supp. at 909.
101. For different individuals, personal starting points might include abstract
logic, foreign perspectives, or global perspectives. See also supra note 44
(quoting Prof. Detlev Vagts) (listing a menu of at least five different views
expressed by participants regarding the proper orientation for the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES).
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practice as the basis for “navigation,” it becomes clear that
the Restatement has staked out a reasonable position on
interim measures in Tentative Draft No. 2.102 More
importantly, the point is that drafting standards force all
stakeholders to accept common starting points for
discussion of every topic. As a result, they can open the way
for debates to reach convergence with fewer confusing
twists and turns along the way.
IV. REFINING THE STANDARD:
EMPHASIS ON THE SUPREME COURT
While helpful in some respects, adoption of domestic
perspectives in the drafting process raises new questions
about the weight assigned to various sources, including
treaties, statutes, and decisions of courts at different levels
in the judicial hierarchy.103 Starting with treaties and
statutes, it seems impossible to deny the fact that the New
York Convention and Federal Arbitration Act represent
aging texts that treat their topics in sparse prose. 104 As a
result, ambiguities emerge in their application to the
complexities of modern commerce. Obviously, someone has
to interpret statutory and treaty texts, and the reporters
have an important role to play. On the other hand, there
remains the matter of what the reporters should adopt at
their guiding star: (1) their own views of the adjustments
102. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 1-1(q).
103. See, e.g., 61 A.L.I. PROC., supra note 44, at 60-65 (recording a discussion
during which speakers suggested the inclusion of decisions of the Supreme
Court, decisions of other federal courts, and statements of the U.S. government
as sources that might inform the domestic perspective on international law).
104. See William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 75, 76 (2002) (describing the Federal Arbitration Act as an
“antiquated arbitration statute” being used as an “all-terrain vehicle” for
different types of arbitration, which “ignores critical distinctions” required for
“judicial supervision” of “different types of cases”). Like the Federal Arbitration
Act, the New York Convention was “drafted in broad and general terms,
designed for application . . . over a period of decades.” BORN, supra note 62, at
101. As a result, “[c]ourts of different countries have sometimes differed in their
interpretation of the Convention; and the Convention itself, which was made for
a simpler, less ‘global-trading’ world, is now beginning to show its age.”
BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 73.
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required “to make U.S. arbitration law coherent and userfriendly”;105 (2) the prevailing views of lower courts; (3) the
perspective of a hypothetical reasonable court; or (4) their
best estimate of how the Supreme Court would rule,
keeping in mind that this particular Restatement operates
in a context where the Supreme Court gets the last word.
In considering the options just mentioned one must bear
in mind that Restatements seek not only to record the
current state of play in U.S. courts,106 but also to express
principles that will have a shelf life measured in decades.107
Furthermore, unlike judges, who can proceed incrementally
and introduce refinements every few years, the drafters of
Restatements must move in one fell swoop, which
necessarily requires the courage to take a certain number of
bold steps.108 Thus, while the predictive value of
Restatements demands a general adherence to the
prevailing views of lower courts, drafters should still enjoy
the freedom to chart a course among splits of authority in

105. Perry, Atlanta, supra note 60 (quoting chief reporter George Bermann).
106. Falk, supra note 1, at 442 (describing the Restatement process as a
“Faustian bargain,” in which “clarity of doctrine is achieved by taking a
snapshot at a given point in time, and then freezing perceptions until the next
photo opportunity, that is, the next [R]estatement”).
107. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 5 (recognizing that “the particular rules
of law need to be reviewed, revised, and restated at least once in every
generation”).
OF

108. In order to ensure the long-term relevance of such projects, drafters must
engage in prognostication about the topics that will remain important over time,
as well as the likely direction of the law. See 76 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., supra
note 27, at 187 (remarks by Louis Henkin). Particularly in unsettled areas, this
latter element may encourage drafters to concentrate less on what the law is,
and more on the direction that it should follow.
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the lower courts109 and even to maneuver where the opinions
of lower courts seem unified, but demonstrably wrong.110
However, that still leaves a question about the extent to
which Supreme Court jurisprudence should limit or guide
their elaboration of the law. On this score, the views of the
reporters have evolved in a direction that raises the bar
required for Congress or the Supreme Court to restrict their
leeway for innovation. For example, in 2009, Professor
Bermann indicated that the reporters would yield to
statutes, treaty provisions, and Supreme Court decisions of
“reasonably settled” meaning:
Yet the latitude that restaters enjoy is limited, because every field
is populated with at least some norms that cannot, or at least are
not supposed to, be violated or ignored. I referred to these earlier
as “givens,” in the sense that they must be respected and
accommodated, even by restaters. Historically, such privileged
authorities
have
included
(a)
settled
constitutional
understandings, (b) legislation of reasonably settled meaning, (c)
international agreements of reasonably settled meaning to which
the U.S. is a party (at least those that have been statutorily
implemented or are deemed to be self-executing), and (d)
reasonably settled case law of the U.S. Supreme Court (or of state
111
supreme courts, where state law is concerned).

Just three years later, Professor Bermann expressed a
standard that places fewer restraints on the reporters: “We
know what some of our constraints are . . . . We won’t defy
the [U.S.] Supreme Court or Congress when they speak
unambiguously, but that leaves a lot of room for discussion

109. See Perry, A Man with Many Hats, supra note 39, at 30 (quoting George
Bermann) (“Where the case law seems divided, we’re completely liberated and
can pick a side.”); see also Perlman, supra note 18, at 4 (“Where jurisdictions
disagree on a particular point, the Restatements do not purport to count
jurisdictions and adopt the majority rule. Rather, the standard is to adopt the
rule that a rational court, faced with the issue for the first time, would find most
persuasive.”).
110. See Perry, A Man with Many Hats, supra note 39, at 30 (quoting George
Bermann) (“The real trick is where the case law isn’t really divided but where
we think there’s something profoundly wrong. These are the instances in which
the strict and liberal constructionists may part ways.”).
111. Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 191 (emphasis added).
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about the degree to which improvement and innovation are
warranted.”112
Despite the reporters’ evident shift towards autonomy,
it remains my view that the Draft Restatement should
accept the pull of Supreme Court jurisprudence because: (1)
the Supreme Court has been almost unrelenting in pushing
lower courts to narrow the gap between local doctrine and
global practice when it comes to the procedures for resolving
international commercial disputes;113 (2) the Supreme
Court’s decisions therefore “have become seminal reference
points for international tribunals, commentators and even
foreign courts in the development of international
arbitration . . .”;114 and (3) while the ALI should cherish its
independence,115 there is a difference between impartiality
112. Perry, Atlanta, supra note 60 (quoting George Bermann) (emphasis
added).
113. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“The
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.”); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (“A parochial refusal by the
courts of one county to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not
only frustrate the[] purposes [of predictability and neutrality], but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical
litigation advantages.”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-39 (1985) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)) (“As international trade has
expanded in recent decades, so too has the use of international arbitration to
resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade. The controversies that
international arbitral institutions are called upon to resolve have increased in
diversity and well as in complexity. Yet the potential of these tribunals for
efficient disposition of legal disagreements arising from commercial relations
has not yet been tested. If they are to take a central place in the international
legal order, national courts will need to ‘shake off the old judicial hostility to
arbitration,’ . . . and also their customary and understandable unwillingness to
cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or
transnational tribunal. To this extent, at least, it will be necessary for national
courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy
favoring commercial arbitration.”) (citation omitted).
114. Bermann et al. (PENN. ST.), supra note 6, at 1334 & n.1.
115. See ALI FOREIGN RELATIONS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 6-7 (emphasizing
that “a private body undertaking a survey in Foreign Relations Law will have
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and freedom.116 An overzealous assertion of the latter in
relation to Supreme Court precedent seems unlikely to
prove appealing to lower courts,117 especially when the
Court’s jurisprudence already represents such a progressive
force in the field of international arbitration.
Where the Supreme Court has not addressed a specific
topic, the question becomes the extent to which the
reporters should seek to anticipate positions that the Court
seems likely to take: in other words, the extent to which the
reporters should try to see unresolved issues through the
eyes of the Court. On the one hand, the ALI’s tendency has
been to view unresolved issues through the eyes of some
hypothetical court, though the standard can be somewhat
diffuse when dealing with decentralized legal frameworks
grounded in domestic state law,118 or customary
an objectivity and a detachment which no official group could possess” and that
the “prestige of the final result will be correspondingly raised”); see also Michael
Traynor, The Future of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 18 SW. J.
INT’L L. 5, 12 (2011) [hereinafter Traynor, The Future] (opining that the “ALI’s
independent and nongovernmental approach can introduce ‘an element of
stabilization’” into the system of international dispute settlement) (quoting Karl
M. Meessen, Special Review Essays: The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 433, 435 (1989)).
116. See OXFORD COMPACT THESAURUS 448 (2d ed. 2001) (listing both
“impartiality” and “freedom” as synonyms for “independence”). Compare
COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 558 (2d ed. 2003) (defining “impartial”
and emphasizing the qualities of neutrality and even-handedness), with id. at
438 (defining “free” and “freedom,” and emphasizing the absence of control or
restraints).
117. See Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 866-67 (1996) (“[T]he Restatement’s influence depends on
whether courts pay attention to it, which in turn depends on whether the
Restatement actually reflects what is happening in the courts.”); see also
Perlman, supra note 18, at 4 (“A Restatement of the Law is firmly grounded in
the existing case law. Thus, it is an effort to restate the governing rules in a
coherent and systematic way. Proposals to adopt or impose the Institute’s own
views as to what the law should be are generally rejected.”).
118. See Perlman, supra note 18, at 4 (“[L]et me say a few words about the
Institute’s official view of what [Restatements] represent. . . . Proposals to adopt
or impose the Institute’s own views as to what the law should be are generally
rejected. . . . Rather, the standard is to adopt the rule that a rational court, faced
with the issue for the first time, would find most persuasive.”). To place
Perlman’s statement in context, one should observe that he is Chancellor of the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, a member of the Council of the American Law
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international law.119 When dealing with topics on which the
Supreme Court clearly has the last word, such as the
interpretation of treaties and statutes of the United
States,120 one might expect the reporters to aim for the views
reasonably likely to be embraced by the Court. On the other
hand, there remain good reasons to avoid vote counting as a
means of divining how narrow majorities might rule based
on the particular constitution of the Court at a given time.121
This observation enjoys particular force in a context where
one expects the Draft Restatement to enjoy a shelf life long
enough to witness substantial turnover on the Court.122
To reconcile the Supreme Court’s central role with
prudential concerns about speculation and vote-counting,
one might propose a model in which the reporters more
consciously adhere to the Supreme Court’s settled approach
to predicate issues (such as the rules of treaty and statutory
interpretation), but having done that, enjoy the freedom to
express their views on ultimate issues without attempting
to predict how narrow majorities might resolve them. This
Institute, and was co-reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION (1994). See Biography of Harvey S. Perlman, U. NEB.,
http://nebraska.edu/administration/chancellors-and-vice-presidents/harvey-sperlman.html (last visited July 15, 2013).
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, at XI, 3
(explaining that the volume sought to state “the rules that an impartial tribunal
would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in accordance with
international law,” meaning the views of a “disinterested tribunal, whether of
the United States or some other national state or an international tribunal”)
(emphasis added). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 18, at XII (“Thus the Restatement of this Subject, in stating the rules of
international law, represents the opinion of The American Law Institute as to
the rules that an international tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a
controversy in accordance with international law.”) (emphasis added).
120. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
121. See Traynor, The Future, supra note 115, at 12 (“The ALI should not
subordinate its view to what could be a very narrow majority or plurality of
justices at a particular time.”).
122. See supra notes 30, 107 and accompanying text. As of this writing, four of
the nine sitting justices are over seventy years old, and three of those four are
over 75. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court,
SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last
visited May 28, 2013).
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model has the twin virtues of allowing the reporters some
leeway while maintaining discipline and increasing the
likelihood that their final product falls within a range of
outcomes framed by the Court’s jurisprudence on predicate
issues. As explained in Parts V and VI, however, the Draft
Restatement pays scant attention to the predicate issues of
treaty and statutory interpretation, with the result that the
foundation for provisions on forum non conveniens and
vacatur of awards contains vast hollow spaces that arguably
cannot support the ALI’s black letter and commentary on
these points. Perhaps for this reason, the provisions on
forum non conveniens and vacatur both contradict the
weight of lower court precedent and seem poorly calculated
to evoke a friendly welcome by the Supreme Court.
V. TREATY INTERPRETATION, FORUM NON CONVENIENS,
AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
As once observed by its chief reporter, the Draft
Restatement operates in a field populated by “givens,” or
norms that cannot be violated or ignored, including
“international agreements of reasonably settled meaning to
which the U.S. is a party.”123 These may include portions of
the New York and Panama Conventions,124 which “occupy a
place in the international commercial arbitration field that
the drafters of the early Restatements [on state-law topics]
could not have imagined,” thus “supply[ing] restaters with
additional ‘givens,’” or norms that demand respect.125 In
other words, reasonably settled treaty obligations may
require the Draft Restatement to repudiate inconsistent
practices not mandated by intervening U.S. statutes or the
U.S. Constitution.126 However, where treaty provisions do
123. Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 191 (emphasis added).
124. See New York Convention, supra note 15; see also Inter-American
Convention on Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448 (1990),
O.A.S. Treaty Series no. 42, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter
Panama Convention].
125. Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 195.
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 115(1)(a)
(“An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if . . . the act
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not yet enjoy settled meanings, they should not be invoked
to repudiate U.S. practices without first demonstrating that
the position at least coincides with settled rules of treaty
interpretation. As explained below, the Draft Restatement
pays scant attention to this predicate issue, with the result
that it incorrectly declares application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine to be incompatible with the United
States’ obligations as a state party to the New York
Convention.127
A. Treaty Interpretation
As every international lawyer knows, the rules set forth
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties call on
states to interpret treaty provisions “in good faith, in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the[ir]
terms . . . [taken] in their context and in the light of [the
treaty’s] object and purpose.”128 “There shall [also] be taken
into account . . . any subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation.”129 “A special meaning shall be
given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.”130 However, the party seeking to establish a
specialized meaning faces a rather heavy burden of proof.131
In addition, one may consult supplementary means of
interpretation, such as drafting history, either to confirm
and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.”); id. § 115(3) (“A
rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement of the
United States will not be given effect as law in the United States if it is
inconsistent with the United States Constitution.”).
127. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29(a); id. §
4-29 cmt. b; id. § 4-29 reporters’ note b.
128. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
129. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
130. Id. art. 31(4).
131. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 244 (2d ed. 2007)
(observing that “the burden of proof of a special meaning will rest on th[e] party”
asserting it); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 938 (6th ed. 2008)
(emphasizing that “the standard of proof is fairly high, since a derogation from
the ordinary meaning of the term is involved”).
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the meaning resulting from the application of text, context,
object and purpose, or to establish the meaning if those
indicators “leave the meaning ambiguous” or lead to a
“manifestly absurd” result.132
Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna
Convention,133 its rules of treaty interpretation reflect
customary international law,134 binding as such on the
United States.135 While Supreme Court jurisprudence
displays a somewhat greater enthusiasm for drafting
history than anticipated by the Vienna Convention,136 one
should take care not to exaggerate the differences between
international and U.S. practice with respect to treaty
interpretation.137 In fact, they reflect a unity of views on the
three key points: both emphasize text,138 both give due
132. VCLT, supra note 128, art. 32(a) & 32(b).
133. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 n.5 (2d Cir.
2000); Aquamar v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A, Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n.40
(11th Cir. 1999); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 638 n.9 (5th Cir.
1994).
134. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 47, 109110 (Feb. 26); Chubb & Son, Inc., 214 F.3d at 308; Aquamar S.A., 179 F.3d at
1296 n.40; Kreimerman, 22 F.3d at 638 n.9.
135. Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before
United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 286 (1988).
136. See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1996);
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 542-46 (1991); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700-02 (1988); Air France v. Saks,
470 U.S. 392, 400-03 (1985); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 325 reporters’ note 4 (indicating that U.S. judicial
practice includes a greater tendency to consult preparatory materials for
purposes of treaty interpretation); Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never
Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1257
(2005) (explaining that the Supreme Court “on occasion” consults “preparatory
work” in the process of treaty interpretation).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
reporters’ note 4.

OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 325

138. See VCLT, supra note 128, art. 31(1) (calling for interpretation “in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty”);
Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 22 (Feb. 3) (explaining that
“[i]nterpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty”); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 630 (7th ed. 2008)
(indicating that the Vienna Convention, the International Court of Justice, the
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consideration to subsequent state practice,139 and neither
favors a teleological approach that gives overriding weight
to broad statements about the purpose or spirit of treaty
provisions.140
International Law Commission, and the Institute of International Law all
emphasize text as the best guide to the common intention of states parties); see
also Eastern Airlines Inc., 499 U.S. at 534-35; Maximov v. United States, 373
U.S. 49, 54 (1963); Glashausser, supra note 136, at 1256.
139. See VCLT, supra note 128, art. 31(3)(b) (requiring consideration of “any
subsequent practice . . . which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation”); AUST, supra note 131, at 241 (opining that
subsequent practice represents “a most important element in the interpretation
of any treaty, and reference to practice is well established in the jurisprudence
of international tribunals”); see also Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 227; Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 535; Air France, 470 U.S. at 403; Glashausser, supra
note 136, at 1257.
While the concordant practice of all parties would provide the best indication of
a common understanding, “[s]ubsequent practice by individual parties also has
some probative value,” especially if met with tacit acceptance. See BROWNLIE,
supra note 138, at 634 (recognizing the probative value of practice by individual
states); see also AUST, supra note 131, at 241, 243 (discussing the value of
subsequent practice that “is consistent and is common to, or accepted, expressly
or tacitly, by all or both parties,” but recognizing that “[i]t is not necessary to
show that each party has engaged in a practice, only that all have accepted it,
albeit tacitly”).
140. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 325
reporters’ note 4 (recognizing that while the Vienna Convention and U.S.
judicial practice “both . . . seek to determine the intention of the parties[,]
neither favors ‘teleological interpretation’ to achieve some purpose overriding
that intention.”); AUST, supra note 131, at 235 (discussing treaty interpretation
under the Vienna Convention, and explaining that “[i]n practice consideration of
object and purpose is more for the purpose of confirming [a textual]
interpretation”). In expressing its views on the teleological approach to treaty
interpretation, the Supreme Court has opined as follows:
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol . . . may
not have contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refugees
and return them to the one country they had desperately sought to
escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 33; but a
treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on
those who ratify it through no more than its general humanitarian
intent. Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say
anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens outside its own
territory, it does not prohibit such actions.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993); Glashausser,
supra note 136, at 1257 (“The Court also has appeared at times to embrace a
teleological approach of examining a treaty’s purpose, but usually simply to add
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As suggested by the foregoing discussion, when it comes
to treaty interpretation, a common error involves the
tendency to describe treaty obligations based on overly
simplified understandings of purpose. To give a concrete
example of this phenomenon, one may refer to the famous
Shrimp/Turtle case, which involved interpretation and
application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s
(GATT’s) general exceptions to treaty obligations:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement,
including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement
of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article
XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and
the prevention of deceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic,
historic or archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
141
on domestic production or consumption . . . .

At the first instance, a World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute settlement panel declared that Article XX
did not permit states to adopt measures that could
“undermine the . . . multilateral trading system,” including
unnecessary support to its conclusions, not to serve as the foundation for
them.”).
141. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
art. XX(a)-(g), 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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measures conditioning market access on compliance with
conservation policies unilaterally adopted by importing
states.142 Subsequently, the WTO’s Appellate Body criticized
the panel for failing to “examine the ordinary meaning” of
the words actually used in Article XX,143 for emphasizing the
trade-liberalizing object and purpose of the GATT as a
whole,144 and for describing those goals in an “overly broad
manner.”145 Focusing on the specific text of Article XX, the
Appellate Body observed that the validation of unilaterally
adopted, national policies represented a common thread
running through the enumeration of general exceptions.146
Taken as a whole, this episode illustrates: (1) a somewhat
common and improper tendency to apply specific treaty
obligations based on overly generalized perceptions of a
treaty’s broad goals; (2) a corresponding and equally
improper tendency to perceive treaty violations that may
not be supported by textual analysis; and (3) the proper
mode of treaty interpretation, which focuses on concrete
data (such as text and state practice) and often leaves states
with broader leeway for action.
Another mistake sometimes made in the context of
treaty practice involves a tendency to focus only on the
existence of treaty rights without considering the possible
consequences of their wrongful exercise in a given case. To
illustrate the significance of that second step, one may
again refer to the Shrimp/Turtle dispute. In that case,
much of the controversy involved disagreements about the
compliance of U.S. conservation measures with the
introductory paragraph of Article XX, which prevents states
from exercising certain rights in a manner that would
constitute “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable” discrimination.147
142. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 116, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 11, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle] (quoting the panel report).
143. Id. ¶ 114, 115.
144. Id. ¶ 116.
145. Id.
146. Id. ¶ 121.
147. GATT, supra note 141, art. XX.
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When applying that provision, the Appellate Body explained
as follows:
The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the
principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general principle
of law and a general principle of international law, controls the
exercise of rights by states. One application of this general
principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de
droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins
that whenever the assertion of a right “impinges on the field
covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide,
148
that is to say, reasonably.”

As further explained by Bin Cheng, the authority
quoted by the Appellate Body:
The principle of good faith which governs international relations
controls also the exercise of rights by States. The theory of the
abuse of rights (abus de droit), recognised in principle by the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice, is merely an application of this principle to the
exercise of rights. . . .
The exercise of a right—or supposed right, since the right no
longer exists—for the sole purpose of causing injury to another is
thus prohibited. Every right is the legal protection of a legitimate
interest. An alleged exercise of a right not in furtherance of such
interest, but with the malicious purpose of injuring others can no
longer claim the protection of the law. . . .
[W]henever [the] exercise [of a right] impinges on the field covered
by the treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to
say reasonably. A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right . . .
is one which is appropriate and necessary for the purpose of the
right (i.e., in furtherance of the interests which the right is
intended to protect). It should at the same time be fair and
equitable as between the parties and not one which is calculated
to procure for one of them an unfair advantage in the light of the
obligation assumed. A reasonable exercise of the right is regarded
as compatible with the obligation. But the exercise of the right in
such a manner as to prejudice the interests of the other
contracting party . . . is unreasonable and is considered as

148. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 142, ¶ 158 (quoting BIN CHENG, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 125
(1953)).
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inconsistent with the bona fide execution of the treaty obligation,
149
and a breach of the treaty.

Finally, as clarified by Cambridge Professor H.C.
Gutteridge in 1933:
To speak of an abuse of a right without attempting to determine
its nature is simply to indulge in a rhetorical flourish . . . . Some
definite criterion is required which will enable us to fix the
circumstances in which the purported exercise of a legal right will
assume a wrongful aspect. . . . The subjective test.—This is based
on an intention to inflict harm . . . which thus becomes the
criterion of the abuse of a right. An act which is done with the sole
or dominant purpose of harming one’s neighbour becomes abusive
and therefore wrongful, even though it may be cloaked with the
outward trappings of a legal right. . . .
The truth of the matter is that when we say that an act is
prompted by an intention to harm we are dealing with something
so impalpable and evasive that this criterion is usually of
restricted value in practice. A man rarely acts with a single
motive; in the majority of cases his intentions are mixed, and it
often becomes impossible to disentangle from the complex of
motives the one which is to be regarded as the sole or even the
dominant impulse of his conduct. . . .
The objective test of intention to harm.—The breaking down in
practice of intention as a subjective test compels us to go further
afield in the search for a suitable criterion of an objective nature.
This may be found in its simplest and least adventurous form in
the adoption of the test of ‘objective intention.’ The attempt to ‘try
the thought of man’ is not wholly abandoned, but the existence of
an ‘animus vicini nocendi’ is deduced from the circumstances
generally . . . , and more particularly from the consequences of the
act, as, for instance, where it is unnecessary or causes excessive
damage. . . .
It is argued that certain rights are not absolute in character, but
must only be utilized in pursuance of a ‘legitimate motive,’ i.e. for
the purpose for which they would be exercised by a hypothetical
reasonable and honest man in the particular circumstances of any
given case. . . . If an objective criterion is to be aimed at, it would
seem . . . to be more logical to abandon the use of a specious
phrase such as ‘legitimate motive’ and to adopt as a test of abuse

149. CHENG, supra note 148, at 121.
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either the ‘unreasonable’ or excessive nature of the exercise of a
150
right . . . .

Taken as a whole, these passages illustrate the need not
only to consider the interpretation of rights created by
treaties, but also the possible loss of those rights through
abusive or unreasonable exercise in particular cases. As
demonstrated below, Supreme Court jurisprudence assigns
a similar function to the forum non conveniens doctrine in
domestic practice.151
B. Forum Non Conveniens
1. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in Broad
Outline. As known to all first-year law students in the
United States, the forum non conveniens doctrine
represents a procedural device,152 whereby courts having
personal and subject matter jurisdiction may exercise their
discretion to dismiss legal proceedings that visit
disproportionate inconvenience on the defendant or the
court, even if they satisfy all the normal venue
requirements.153 Generally speaking, application of the
150. H.C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22, 25-27 (1933).
151. See infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
152. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 454 n.4 (1994); Misener Marine
Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832, 840-41 (11th Cir. 2010); In
re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of
Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 496 (2d Cir. 2002); Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios
Maritimos, S.A. de C.V. v. M/T Respect, 89 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 1996).
153. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (“The principle of
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute.”); Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir.
2011) (same); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., on July 9, 1982,
821 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Hamilton v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); see also Esfeld v. Costa
Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Forum non
conveniens is an ancient common law doctrine that permits a court to decline
jurisdiction over a case, even if personal jurisdiction and venue are otherwise
proper, when there is a more convenient forum for the case to be litigated.”);
Dahl v. United Techs. Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1029 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Forum non
conveniens presupposes the existence of two judicial forums each possessing
jurisdiction and venue over the action, but posits that one forum may resist
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doctrine requires a three-step analysis, in which one
determines: (1) the degree of deference properly accorded to
the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the existence of an
adequate alternative forum; and (3) whether the balance of
public and private interest factors justifies dismissal.154 In
invocation of its jurisdiction when trial of the action would more appropriately
proceed in the other forum.”).
154. See, e.g., Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2001)
(en banc); see also Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 835-37
(5th Cir. 1993) (applying a slightly different three-part test, focusing on (1) the
existence of an adequate alternative forum, (2) the weighing of “private interest”
factors, and (3) the weighing of “public interest” factors).
With respect to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, courts frequently observe that the
choice of a U.S. forum by non-resident aliens deserves little deference. Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981); Jiali Tang v. Synutra Int’l Inc.,
656 F.3d 242, 252 (4th Cir. 2011). By contrast, the choices of U.S. citizens and
resident aliens deserve substantial deference. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56
(citizens); Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (citizens);
Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1177 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006)
(resident aliens); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir.
2000) (residents).
When applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, courts define the private
interest factors to include “‘ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.’” Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting
Gulf Oil Corp, 330 U.S. at 508).
When applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, courts generally define the
public interest factors to include the:
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the “local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home”; the interest
in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with
the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary
problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the
unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.
Id. (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509). In addition, courts have also considered
strong substantive policies of the United States, such as providing relief to the
victims of torture and extrajudicial killings. Wiwa, 226 F.2d at 103-06.
Presumably, the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of Convention
awards also requires due consideration as a public interest factor. Cf. Figueiredo
Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 401 (2d
Cir. 2011) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “courts must be cautious in
applying forum non conveniens in the context of actions to enforce arbitration
awards under the New York and Panama Conventions,” given “the text and the
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applying the third step, courts must decide whether the
facts “either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation
to a defendant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiff’s
convenience . . . , or (2) make trial in the chosen forum
inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s
own administrative and legal problems.”155 In this sense, the
doctrine represents “a supervening venue provision,”156
which enables courts to resist the abusive or unjust
assertion of legal rights.157 So conceived, its function roughly
mirrors the abuse of rights doctrine in civil law
jurisdictions.158 Whatever the particular label, however, the
history of the Conventions as well as the need to ensure the dependability and
impartiality of international arbitration so as to promote transnational
commerce”).
155. Koster v. Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). This
remains the standard commonly applied by the Supreme Court and lower
courts. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co., Ltd. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
422, 429 (2007); Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 447-48; Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at
402; Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d 520,
525 (6th Cir. 2010); Europhins Pharma US Holdings v. Bioalliance Pharma, 623
F.3d 147, 160 (3d Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Island Seas Invs., Ltd., 590 F.3d 1264,
1269 (11th Cir. 2009); Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir.
2009); Compania Naviera Joanna SA v. Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster NV,
569 F.3d 189, 200 (4th Cir. 2009); Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623, 628 (7th
Cir. 2008).
156. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 429 (quoting Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 453);
see also Zions First Nat’l Bank, 629 F.3d at 523 n.1; Loya v. Starwood Hotels &
Resorts Worldwide, 583 F.3d 656, 663 (9th Cir. 2009); Yavuz, 576 F.3d at 1172.
157. As numerous courts, have observed, the “doctrine of forum non conveniens
rests upon a court’s inherent power to control the parties and cases before it and
to prevent its process from becoming an instrument of abuse or injustice.” In re
Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1153-54; Simcox v. McDermott Int’l, Inc, 152
F.R.D. 689, 693 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (same); see also Baumgart, 981 F.2d at 828
(explaining that the forum non conveniens doctrine “derives from the court’s
inherent power, under Article III of the Constitution, to control the
administration of the litigation before it and to prevent its process from
becoming an instrument of abuse, injustice, and oppression”) (quoting In re Air
Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1155).
158. See Ellen L. Hayes, Forum Non Conveniens in England, Australia and
Japan: The Allocation of Jurisdiction in Transnational Litigation, 26 U. BRITISH
COLUMBIA L. REV. 41, 56 (1992) (“Strictly speaking the Japanese courts do not
have a doctrine of forum non conveniens. . . . It is submitted however that the
objectives of the forum non conveniens doctrine have been accomplished in
Japan as a result of the Supreme Court’s view that international jurisdiction
should be tested on the basis of the principles of ‘justice and reasonableness’
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point is that in a modern legal context where broad
jurisdictional and venue statutes have become the norm, 159
such devices have become necessary safeguards against
abuse.160
2. U.S. Jurisprudence on Forum Non Conveniens
Dismissals of Convention Awards. Because the enforcement
of Convention awards involves summary proceedings and
the application of internationally uniform substantive
norms,161 they generally raise little prospect of
inconvenience for respondents or U.S. courts,162 with the
result that observers generally regard them as poor
candidates for dismissal based on the forum non conveniens
doctrine.163 Consistent with these insights, U.S. courts
generally have assumed that they possess the competence to
(jori). In addition, a similar doctrine could also be developed as an application of
the prohibition on abuse of rights . . . .”).
159. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 250 (“Jurisdiction and venue requirements are
often easily satisfied.”); see also Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507 (observing that venue
“statutes are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a
choice of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue
his remedy”).
160. See Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir.
2011) (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507) (“Historically, the doctrine’s purpose is
to root out cases in which the ‘open door’ of broad jurisdiction and venue laws
‘may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with
some harassment,’ and particularly cases in which a plaintiff resorts ‘to a
strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary.’”); see
also Piper, 454 U.S. at 249 n.15 (explaining that “dismissal may be warranted
where a plaintiff chooses a particular forum, not because it is convenient, but
solely in order to harass the defendant or take advantage of favorable law”).
161. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-33(a)
cmt. a (emphasizing that post-award actions involving Convention and nonConvention awards “are summary proceedings”).
162. See id. § 4-29 reporters’ note a (“Actions of this sort seldom raise . . .
significant convenience considerations.”).
163. See id. § 4-29 cmt. a (“Actions for post-award relief are ordinarily
summary in nature and do not entail significant fact-finding. . . . Thus, they are
generally poor candidates for forum non conveniens treatment.”) (citation
omitted); id. reporters’ note a (“As a practical matter, the prospects for
international forum non conveniens motions in post-award actions are not
great.”); MOSES, supra note 62, at 206 (opining that the forum non conveniens
doctrine “should rarely justify a refusal to recognize or enforce a Convention
award . . . .”).
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apply the forum non conveniens doctrine in proceedings to
enforce Convention awards, but have concluded that the
specific facts do not justify relief.164 However, in 2002 and
again in 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit invoked the forum non conveniens doctrine
to dismiss enforcement actions involving Convention
awards,165 which triggered expressions of dismay from
leaders of the U.S. international arbitration community.166
Read broadly, the two decisions seem to invite the dismissal
of enforcement actions involving foreign parties to foreign
arbitrations that relate to transactions on foreign soil,167 to
reframe the “public interest” factors in a manner that

164. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29
reporters’ note b(ii) (citing Venture Global Eng’g LLC v. Satyam Computer
Servs., 233 Fed. Appx. 517, 520-22 (6th Cir. 2007); TMR Energy, Ltd. v. State
Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 304 (2d Cir. 2005); Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd.
v. Fed. Gov’t of Nig., 697 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2010); Higgins v. SPX Corp.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20771, at *10-*13 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006)).
165. Figueiredo Ferraz e Engenharia de Projecto LTDA. v. Republic of Peru,
665 F.3d 384, 393-94 (2d Cir. 2011); Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M.
(Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 501 (2d Cir. 2002).
166. See, e.g., William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and
National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 251, 262 (2006) (opining that “the Second Circuit seems to have gone astray
as a matter of both logic and history”); William W. Park et al., International
Commercial Dispute Resolution, 37 INT’L LAW. 445, 450 (2003) (indicating that
the Second Circuit’s decision in Monde Re “fundamentally misapprehend[s] the
rationale of the New York Convention . . .”); George A. Bermann, Bermann on
Figueiredo Ferraz v. Republic of Peru, CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://conflictoflaws.net/2011/bermann-on-figueiredo-ferraz-v-republic-of-peru/
(describing the Second Circuit’s opinion as a “sadly misguided” and “regrettable”
decision that is “inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations”); see also BORN, supra
note 62, at 2402 (concluding that “the refusal . . . to enforce an award on forum
non conveniens grounds is contrary to the New York Convention”).
167. As partial justification for the forum non conveniens dismissal in Monde
Re, the Second Circuit pointed out that all parties were aliens, who performed
the underlying commercial transactions outside the United States and who
resolved their differences through arbitration outside the United States. Monde
Re, 311 F.3d at 500. Because these particular statements would apply to a very
large range of enforcement actions under the New York and Panama
Conventions, they understandably provoked concern that the decision throws
open the door to forum non conveniens dismissal of actions to enforce foreign
Convention awards.
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lowers the threshold required to secure dismissal,168 and to
increase the scope for appellate courts to second-guess
district judges who elect to retain jurisdiction over
enforcement proceedings.169
Read in a properly narrow context, however, each case
involved unusual facts unlikely to recur in future
enforcement proceedings. For example, while most people
forget, Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v.
Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine “grew out of a dispute that led to
elevated political tensions and raised concerns about energy
security in Europe.”170 According to Russia, Ukraine’s stateowned gas concern had made significant, unauthorized
withdrawals from pipelines carrying natural gas from
Russia to Western Europe.171 Accepting the allegations as
true, a reinsurer (Monde Re) covered the Russian losses and
then (as subrogee) brought arbitration proceedings in
Moscow against Ukraine’s state-owned gas concern.172 One

168. In justifying forum non conveniens dismissal in Figueiredo, the Second
Circuit focused almost exclusively on Peru’s interest in applying a domestic
statute that prohibits state agencies from paying more than three percent of
their annual operating budgets to satisfy any particular judgment. Figueiredo,
665 F.3d at 392. This departs from the tendency to focus on “public interest”
factors of particular relevance to U.S. courts. See supra note 154 and
accompanying text.
169. The Second Circuit’s decision in Figueiredo represented an anomaly in
the sense that it reversed the district court’s decision not to dismiss the
enforcement action on forum non conveniens grounds. Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at
386, 393-94. In so doing, the court appeared to retreat from the abuse of
discretion standard that normally applies to such matters. See Piper Aircraft v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (“The forum non conveniens determination is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered
all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these
factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.”).
170. Charles H. Brower II, Reflection on Forum Non Conveniens: Monde Re
Was
Right?!?,
KLUWER
ARBITRATION
BLOG
(Mar.
16,
2010),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/03/16/reflections-on-forum-nonconveniens-monde-re-was-right/.
171. Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 491.
172. Id.
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year later, the tribunal awarded Monde Re over $88 million
by majority vote.173
In due course, Monde Re brought enforcement
proceedings in New York against Ukraine’s state-owned gas
concern and against the Ukrainian government, which was
not a party to the underlying contract, had not been joined
in the arbitration proceedings, and was not named in the
award.174 As a result, Monde Re’s enforcement action did not
represent a typical, summary proceeding against the award
debtor.175 To the contrary, it sought to establish the
Ukrainian government’s responsibility based on veilpiercing theories that were asserted in a politically volatile
context and required complex examination of evidence
located in East European capitals.176
Given the circumstances just described, the Ukrainian
government sought dismissal under the forum non
conveniens doctrine.177 After consideration, the district court
granted the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed.178 In so
doing, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the
circumstances did not contemplate summary enforcement
proceedings against the award debtor.179 To the contrary,
the proceedings sought the extension of liability to a third
party based on theories that would require a complex
inquiry
into
politically
sensitive
relationships.180
Furthermore, the inquiry would require consideration of
evidence located in foreign states, which clearly had
stronger interests in the matter.181 Because that particular
factual matrix cried out for the exercise of discretion and
does not seem prone to frequent repetition, one may regard

173. Id.
174. Id. at 492, 494, 500.
175. Id. at 500.
176. Id. at 494-95, 500.
177. Id. at 492.
178. Id. at 492, 501.
179. Id. at 500.
180. Id. at 494-95, 500.
181. Id. at 500-01.
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Monde Re as a sensible decision easily justified under the
forum non conveniens doctrine,182 and other legal theories.183
Nine years later, in Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoria e
Engenharia de Projecto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, the
alignment of parties and the procedural history called forth
memories of Monde Re: the claimant brought an arbitration
and received an award against a state-controlled program in
Peru (“Water for All”), then sought enforcement in New
York not only against the named counterparty, but also
against the Republic of Peru based on veil-piercing
arguments.184 However, the similarity stopped there.
Contrary to the situation in Monde Re, the district court
held that the veil-piercing arguments could be resolved
without further collection of evidence because the Peruvian
Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation had itself:
(1) made partial payments of sums due under the award; (2)
asserted, in intra-governmental correspondence, that the
Ministry of Economy and Finance had an obligation to
satisfy the award; and (3) initiated proceedings to set aside
the award in Peruvian courts.185
Also contrary to the situation in Monde Re, the case did
not raise questions that would have drawn U.S. courts into
explosive political controversies involving two or more
182. See MOSES, supra note 62, at 207 (concluding that the unusual
circumstances in Monde Re “make it one of those rare cases where application of
forum non conveniens may have been justified”); Joseph E. Neuhaus, Current
Issues in the Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, 36 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 35 (2004) (emphasizing the “highly unusual facts” in
Monde Re and concluding that the decision represented a “hard case” that made
“good law”).
183. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29
reporters’ note b(ii) (expressing the view that “the Second Circuit in Monde Re
arguably could have reached the same result . . . by questioning the proper
status of the parties.”); id. § 4-31(b)(1) (recognizing the discretionary power of
courts to decline recognition of persons as proper defendants if “determining the
status of the non-party in the post-award action would unduly complicate that
action . . .”).
184. Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoria e Engenharia de Projecto Ltda. v. Republic
of Peru, 655 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d, 655 F3d 384 (2d Cir.
2011).
185. Id. at 371.
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foreign states. Given the simplicity of the issues and the
absence of political turbulence, the district court exercised
its discretion not to dismiss the enforcement action on
forum non conveniens grounds.186
In a final contrast to Monde Re, the Second Circuit
reversed the district court’s denial of forum non conveniens
dismissal, based almost exclusively on Peru’s interest in
applying a domestic statute that prohibits state agencies
from paying more than three percent of their annual
operating budgets to satisfy any particular judgment.187
As in Monde Re, however, the case involved a set of
highly unusual circumstances that drew the Second
Circuit’s attention, including the facts that: (1) Peru
represented the legal seat of arbitration; (2) the arbitral
tribunal rendered its decision ex aequo et bono and awarded
the claimant more than $21 million; (3) the Ministry
requested a Peruvian court to set aside the award on the
grounds that Peruvian law limits recovery to the amount of
the contract for international arbitrations involving a nondomestic party; (4) the Peruvian court denied set-aside
because the claimant “had designated itself a Peruvian
domiciliary in the agreement and the arbitration,” with the
result that “the arbitration was a ‘national arbitration’
involving only domestic parties”; (5) when seeking
enforcement of the award in New York, the claimant
described itself as a Brazilian corporation; and (6) Peru’s
appellate brief stridently argued that the claimant should
be deemed a Peruvian national, given the position it had
taken in the agreement, the arbitration and the set-aside
proceedings.188
Seizing on the facts just mentioned, the Second Circuit
seemed exceedingly reluctant to allow an ostensibly
Peruvian entity to use enforcement proceedings to avoid the
186. Id. at 374-77.
187. Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at 392.
188. Id. at 387 (emphasis added); Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 57-59,
Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoria e Engenharia de Projecto Ltda. v. Republic of
Peru, 665 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-3925); Reply Brief for DefendantsAppellants at 29, Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoria e Engenharia de Projecto Ltda.
v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-3925).
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application of Peru’s statutory cap on payments when
dealing with the Peruvian government in a contract both
executed and performed in Peru.189 Viewed from this
perspective, Figueiredo involved relationships so squarely
grounded in a single jurisdiction that the resulting
arbitration could not possibly have qualified for coverage by
almost any of the leading instruments on international
commercial arbitration.
Going back to the early history of treaties on the topic,
the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses applies
only to agreements “between parties subject respectively to
the jurisdiction of different Contracting States.”190 The 1927
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards applies only to awards “made in pursuance of an
agreement . . . covered by the [1923 Geneva Protocol],”
meaning an agreement between parties having diverse
nationalities.191
Similarly, the 1961 European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration applies only to
agreements and awards “arising from international trade
between physical or legal persons having . . . their habitual
place of residence or their seat in different Contracting
States.”192
Likewise, in the preamble to the 1975 Inter-American
(Panama) Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, states parties express their desire to “conclud[e]
a convention on international commercial arbitration.”193
While none of the operative articles expressly limits that
instrument’s coverage to international commercial disputes,
the limitation finds confirmation in Article 3, which
provides: “[i]n the absence of an express agreement between
189. Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at 387, 392.
190. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, art. 1, Sept. 24, 1923, 27
L.N.T.S. 157.
191. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 1,
Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
192. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art.
I(1)(a), Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364.
193. Panama Convention, supra note 124, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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the parties, the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance
with the rules of procedure of the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission” (IACAC Rules).194 It
seems unlikely that states parties, such as the United
States, contemplated application of the IACAC Rules to
purely domestic arbitrations in which the disputing parties
failed to identify a set of arbitration rules.195
Finally, and most recently, the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration applies only to
“international
commercial
arbitration,”
defined
to
encompass situations where: (1) the parties have their
places of business in different states; (2) the arbitration is
seated outside the state in which the parties have their
places of business; (3) a substantial place of contractual
performance lies outside the state in which the parties have
their places of business; or (4) “the parties have expressly
agreed that the subject matter of the [dispute] relates to
more than one country.”196 Obviously, none of these criteria
applied in Figueiredo.
True to its official name, the (New York) Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards applies to any award rendered on the territory of a
foreign state (or, if the state of enforcement has adopted the
reciprocity reservation, the Convention applies to any
award rendered on the territory of a foreign state party).197
Unlike almost every other leading instrument, the New
York Convention does not require the disputing parties to
have diverse nationalities or to engage in transactions that
cross national borders.

194. Id. art. 3.
195. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-501, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
675, 676-77 (emphasizing the Panama Convention’s role in facilitating
“international commerce,” “trade,” and “foreign investment”); cf. John P.
Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 37 (2000) (“Application of the Panama
Convention to international arbitration permeates the Convention from
beginning to end.”).
196. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 64, art. 1(1), art. 1(3).
197. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. I(1), art I.(3).
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While the New York Convention aims primarily “to
facilitate arbitration in international commerce,” and while
an early International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
prototype had referred to “international awards,” anxieties
about a-national (stateless) awards, and the difficulties of
defining international commerce, prompted delegates to the
New York Convention’s 1958 drafting conference to reorient
that instrument’s coverage toward foreign awards.198 As a
result, the New York Convention technically applies to
foreign awards grounded in a single jurisdiction. Thus, for
purposes of enforcement in the United States, an award
falls under the Convention even if rendered in Paris
between two French wine merchants under a contract for
the sale of French wine.199
In his seminal work on the New York Convention,
Albert Jan van den Berg describes this phenomenon as a
“harmless ‘side-effect’” that “scarcely occurs in practice” and
had “not occurred in any of the reported cases” as of 1981.200
In addition, he opines that the New York Convention’s
uniquely broad scope might prove useful in cases where the
losing parties to domestic arbitrations possess substantial
bank accounts in foreign jurisdictions.201 While van den
Berg’s assessment holds true as a general matter, one
wonders if the “side-effect” remains so “harmless” when
private parties exploit it to reach the assets of their own
governments, thus draining the national treasury in
violation of otherwise applicable national laws.202
198. ALBERT JAN
1958, at 17 (1981).

VAN DEN

BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION

OF

199. Id.
200. Id. at 18.
201. Id.
202. Confirming the potential for mischief in the circumstances just outlined,
one need not search long for precedent rejecting the efforts of disgruntled
national corporations to circumvent the limits of domestic redress against their
own governments by invoking the machinery of international dispute
settlement. Cf. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 223 (June 26, 2003), 7 ISCID Rep. 421 (2005) (finding it
“inconceivable” that states would negotiate treaties to provide their own citizens
with international avenues for redress of regulatory disputes). This holds true
even in the context of the New York Convention, where the only court to address
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Of course, the New York Convention’s unusually broad
scope should not apply to cases that, like Figueiredo, arise
under the Panama Convention. As mentioned above and
recognized by some courts, the Panama Convention does not
cover foreign awards involving parties, transactions, and
arbitral proceedings grounded in a single foreign
jurisdiction.203 However, this clear understanding of the
Panama Convention’s scope reveals an anomaly in the
Federal Arbitration Act. Despite the obvious differences
between the respective scopes of the Panama and New York
Conventions, the United States inexplicably implemented
the Panama Convention through a statutory provision that
incorporates by reference most of the New York
Convention’s implementing legislation.204 As a result, while
the Panama Convention applies only to international
commercial arbitration, the United States has extended its
coverage by statute to awards grounded in a single foreign
jurisdiction.205 While “harmless” in most cases, this littleknown “side-effect” could prove to be both unexpected and
aggravating to foreign governments dealing with their own
citizens in domestic transactions on matters of public
importance. Under these circumstances, it seems wise to
preserve remedies for the particular “side-effect” just
described. In some legal traditions, dismissals based on

the issue outside the Second Circuit invoked the forum non conveniens doctrine
to dismiss an enforcement action brought by a foreign entity against its own
government with respect to an arbitration involving public utilities and seated
in the state of the disputing parties’ nationality. Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v.
Electrificadora del Atlantico S.A. E.S.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 87, 103-04 (D.D.C.
2006).
203. See Energy Transport, Ltd. v. M.V. San Sebastian, 348 F. Supp. 2d 186,
199 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“For example, if parties sought enforcement in the United
States of an award rendered in Panama, involving only Panamanian citizens
conducting a domestic transaction, the New York Convention would likely apply
but the Inter-American Convention would not because of the award’s purely
domestic character.”); Bowman, supra note 195, at 39 (“Under the Panama
Convention, . . . a foreign award rendered . . . in Uruguay, involving only
Uruguayan citizens engaged in a domestic transaction, may not be
enforceable.”).
204. See 9 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
205. Bowman, supra note 195, at 39 n.104, 75.
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personal jurisdiction,206 or foreign sovereign immunity,207
might fit the bill. In other traditions, forum non conveniens
dismissals might serve equally well.
3. The New York Convention and Forum Non
Conveniens
Dismissals:
The
Draft
Restatement’s
Misunderstanding of International Law. From its earliest
iterations, the black letter of the Draft Restatement has
taken the position that actions “for the enforcement of . . .
Convention award[s] [are] not subject to . . . dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds.”208 Under the neutral veneer
of that formulation, however, initial drafts of the reporters’
notes elaborated the principle more stridently, emphasizing
that “the Restatement rejects the view that forum non
conveniens is a proper basis for . . . dismissing an action
seeking recognition or enforcement of a Convention
award.”209 While more recent drafts have moderated the
tone of the reporters’ notes,210 the black letter remains
unchanged.211
206. See BORN, supra note 62, at 2400 (describing a case in which the Swiss
Federal Tribunal “refused to enforce an arbitral award made in Switzerland
against a foreign state, in a case involving non-Swiss parties, on the grounds
that the award lacked sufficient connection with Switzerland to be enforced
there”) (emphasis added). According to Mr. Born, the ruling “is confined to the
context of awards against foreign states.” Id. at 2400 n.373.
207. Id. at 2400 (recognizing that “the context of awards against foreign states
. . . raise[s] issues of state immunity”). As explained below, although the New
York Convention does not address the topic of foreign sovereign immunity, it is
not clear that international standards require treatment of arbitration
agreements as waivers of immunity from enforcement and execution, and it is
not clear that international standards affect the immunity of states in claims
brought by the own nationals. See infra notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
208. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 22; DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 5-21.
209. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 22 reporters’
note a; DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 5-21
reporters’ note a.
210. As of this writing, the most recent version of the reporters’ notes (1) no
longer “rejects” the view that forum non conveniens dismissals of Convention
awards can be a proper remedy, (2) describes the “dominant view” among U.S.
courts as favoring the permissibility of such relief, and (3) recognizes that
“courts have traditionally been willing to entertain motions to dismiss
enforcement proceedings based on forum non conveniens . . . ,” but (4)
nevertheless “takes the position that the doctrine is not available in actions to
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The ALI’s official justification for its position on forum
non conveniens remained constant for the first seven drafts.
As explained in official comments to the black letter,212 the
ALI relied on the “basic notion” that the New York and
Panama Conventions “impose an enforcement obligation on
Contracting States” absent a “Convention defense to
enforcement.”213 In more recent drafts, the ALI eliminated
the reference to the “basic notion” of the New York and
Panama Conventions, and replaced it with the word
“requirement,” so that the comments now assert: “Stay or
dismissal of an action to confirm or enforce a Convention
award based on forum non conveniens would run afoul of
the Conventions’ requirement that, absent a specific
Convention defense to enforcement, Contracting States
confirm and enforce such awards.”214 While the shift from

enforce Convention awards.” DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra
note 5, § 4-29 reporters’ note b(ii) (emphasis added).
211. See id. § 4-29(a).
212. Though it is, perhaps, not widely known, the black letter and the
comments contained in Restatements represent the official views of the ALI,
whereas the reporters’ notes reflect only the personal views of the reporters. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, at XI; James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The
Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1149 (2001);
McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 317); Michael Traynor, John P. Frank: Foreword,
35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 219, 224 (2003).
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 22 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2009) (emphasis added);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 22 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2009) (emphasis added);
DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 22 cmt. a (emphasis
added); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 3), supra note 62, § 22 cmt.
a (emphasis added); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 61,
§ 5-21 cmt. a (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5-21 cmt. a (Council Draft No. 2,
2010) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 2)] (emphasis added);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 4-18 Alternative A, cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2011)
(emphasis added).
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 4-29 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2011) [hereinafter DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 5)] (emphasis added); DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, § 4-29 cmt. b (emphasis added); DRAFT
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“basic notion” to “requirement” suggests a greater degree of
linguistic precision, the substance of the official
commentary seems unchanged: the general purpose of the
New York and Panama Conventions is to secure
enforcement of Convention awards in the absence of seven
enumerated grounds for refusal, which prevents the
termination of enforcement proceedings on any other
grounds, including forum non conveniens.
In contrast to the ALI’s official position, the reporters’
personal views on the justifications for rejecting the forum
non conveniens doctrine have evolved substantially over
time. Early drafts of the reporters’ notes relied on four
themes to explain the rejection of forum non conveniens
dismissals for actions to enforce Convention awards.215 First,
Supreme Court precedent identifies the goal of the New
York Convention as securing unification of “the standards
by which . . . awards are enforced in the signatory states.”216
Second, given the New York and Panama Conventions’
enumeration of exclusive grounds for refusal to enforce
awards, “it would be incompatible . . . to employ
inconvenience as an additional basis” for denying
enforcement of Convention awards.217 Third, while Article
III of the New York Convention permits states to enforce
awards “in accordance with” their own “rules of procedure,”
the use of a “national procedural device” to secure dismissal
“would be inconsistent with the understanding that . . . the
grounds for nonenforcement of Convention awards set out
in the relevant Convention are exclusive . . . .”218 And fourth,
“since civil-law jurisdictions generally do not embrace the
forum non conveniens doctrine, availability of the doctrine
would also undermine the goal of unifying grounds for
RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29 cmt. b (emphasis
added).
215. See supra note 212 (indicating that the reporters’ notes only reflect the
personal views of the reporters on any given topic).
216. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 5-21
reporters’ note a (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15
(1974)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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denying recognition and enforcement under the
Convention.”219
Perhaps because the early drafts of reporters’ notes
lacked detailed examination of treaty text and, thus,
persuasive force, subsequent iterations accord considerably
more recognition to the rights of states to apply their own
“rules of procedure” to enforcement actions under Article III
of the New York Convention. Thus, while recognizing that
the text of Article III “arguably permits courts to apply
forum non conveniens to . . . Convention awards” as a
procedural device, the reporters’ notes to Tentative Draft
No. 2 opine that “the interpretation is not consistent with
the purpose or larger structure of the Convention,” deemed
to include the goal of unification and a framework that
encompasses a limited number of enumerated grounds to
refuse enforcement of Convention awards.220 In addition,
and contrary to previous drafts,221 the reporters’ notes have
more recently asserted that “forum non conveniens is not a
purely procedural rule.”222 According to this newly
formulated view, Article III only allows states parties to
apply purely procedural rules that determine how litigation
may proceed.223 These would include requirements that
219. Id. But see supra note 158 and accompanying text (indicating that civil
law countries may use other devices, including the doctrine of abuse of rights, to
perform the same basic function as the forum non conveniens doctrine).
220. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29
reporters’ note b(ii) (emphasis added); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No.
3), supra note 75, § 4-29 reporters’ note b(ii) (emphasis added).
221. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 1), supra note 213, § 22 cmt.
b (recognizing that the “forum non conveniens doctrine is generally regarded as
procedural”); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 2), supra note 213, §
22 cmt. b (same); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 22
cmt. b (same); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 3), supra note 61, §
22 cmt. b (same); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1), supra note 61, § 521 cmt. b (same); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 2), supra note 213, § 521 cmt. b (same).
222. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29
reporters’ note b(ii) (emphasis added); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No.
3), supra note 75, § 4-29 reporters’ note b(ii) (emphasis added).
223. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29
reporters’ note b(ii); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-29 reporters’ note b(ii).
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govern the submissions of pleadings, the availability of pretrial discovery, and the admissibility of evidence.224 In
contrast, the reporters’ notes suggest that Article III does
not allow states parties to apply procedural rules that
determine whether litigation should proceed.225 Thus, in
224. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29
reporters’ note b(ii); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-29 reporters’ note b(ii). Of course, the reference to “pre-trial” discovery seems
puzzling because enforcement actions under the Conventions are widely
regarded as summary proceedings, heard as motions as opposed to plenary
actions in the United States. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2),
supra note 5, § 4-29 cmt. a (“Actions for post-award relief are ordinarily
summary in nature and do not entail significant fact-finding.”); id. reporters’
note a (“[P]ost-award actions generally are summary proceedings, requiring no
witness testimony or introduction of other evidence.”); id. § 4-33(a) (“A postaward action is ordinarily a summary proceeding, whether brought by motion or
otherwise.”); id. § 4-33 cmt. a (“Generally, post-award actions are summary
proceedings . . . . Motions are the usual vehicle.”).
Also, one might argue pre-trial discovery has a substantive aspect and, like
forum non conveniens, does not represent a purely procedural tool. See Luis J.
Diaz & Patrick C. Dunican Jr., Ending the Revolving Door Syndrome in Law, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 947, 998 (2011) (“In the real world, the iterative process of
fact gathering is critical to legal analysis and outcomes.”); Richard Marcus,
Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class
Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 356 (2011) (“From plaintiffs’ (and
perhaps defendants’) perspective, it may be that something approaching full
discovery is essential. Particularly when they intend to rely on expert opinions .
. . to prove their cases at trial, anything less may be too risky.”).
In addition, one should recognize that, compared with forum non conveniens,
pre-trial discovery is more unique to the United States and more intensely
despised in foreign legal systems. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 969-71 (5th ed. 2011)
(“The broad, party-controlled character of U.S. pretrial discovery contrasts
sharply with methods for obtaining evidence in many foreign countries. . . .
Unilateral U.S. discovery of materials located abroad has frequently provoked
vigorous foreign resistance.”); James H. Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures,
13 INT’L LAW. 5, 5 (1979) (“The . . . virtually boundless sweep of the pre-trial
procedures presently permitted by many American courts is so completely alien
to the procedure in most other jurisdictions that an attitude of suspicion and
hostility is created . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 4, § 442 reporters’ note 1 (“No aspect of the extension of the American
legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to
so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in
the United States.”).
225. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29
reporters’ note b(ii).

2013]

HOLLOW SPACES

793

their view, Article III does not permit states to apply local
doctrines that “regulate[] access to courts,”226 particularly
when they invite the exercise of discretion.227
As explained below, however, the ALI and its reporters
appear to have committed both of the mistakes likely to be
made in the context of treaty interpretation, namely (1)
overreliance on broad goals to the exclusion of text and
subsequent state practice, and (2) failure to consider the
consequences of abusive or unreasonable exercise of treaty
rights in particular cases. As a result, they have chosen the
wrong frames of reference and adopted the wrong
conclusions about the compatibility of limited forum non
conveniens dismissals with U.S. obligations under the New
York and Panama Conventions.
As already seen in the context of the Shrimp/Turtle
case, there is an inappropriate tendency to overemphasize
broad goals (and to neglect text and subsequent state
practice as landmarks) in the process of treaty
interpretation.228 Whatever the merits of that approach in
the context of human rights litigation,229 international
tribunals like the WTO’s Appellate Body have rightly
condemned it in the context of international agreements
regulating commercial activities.230 Yet, that seems to be
226. Id.
227. Id. reporters’ note b(i).
228. See discussion supra Part V.A.
229. See SHAW, supra note 131, at 937-38 (observing that “[t]he more dynamic
approach to [treaty] interpretation is . . . evident in the context of human rights
treaties,” where adjudicators have adopted “a more flexible and . . . purposeoriented method of interpretation . . . .”); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 138, at
636 (recounting that “[t]he work of the European Court of Human Rights has
involved a tendency to an effective and ‘evolutionary’ approach in applying the
European Convention on Human Rights”).
230. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. One of the reasons for
criticism is that teleological interpretation tends to open the door to judicial lawmaking. See SHAW, supra note 131, at 933 (explaining that reliance on broad
statements of purpose tends to encourage “judicial law-making” because one
must rely on adjudicators to define the purposes of treaties); see also BROWNLIE,
supra note 138, at 636 (warning that teleological interpretation “may involve a
judicial implementation of purposes in a fashion not contemplated in fact by the
parties”).
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exactly the mistake committed in the Draft Restatement’s
treatment of forum non conveniens. For example, in its
official commentary, the ALI has long asserted that forum
non conveniens dismissals contradict the “basic notion” of
treaties recognizing a limited number of specified grounds
for refusing to enforce awards.231 Notably, the ALI did not
support its conclusion with analysis of text or state practice.
While the reporters’ notes acknowledge that the text of
Article III might be construed to permit the application of
forum non conveniens as a rule of procedure,232 the reporters
then invoke sweeping generalizations about the treaty’s
“purpose” and “larger structure” to reach exactly the
opposite conclusion.233 To the extent that the reporters’
notes specifically engage Article III, they claim—without
analysis of text or state practice—that the treaty provision
only encompasses “purely procedural” rules that regulate
the mode of presenting claims.234 According to this view,
Article III does not permit the application of national rules
that eliminate the possibility of bringing certain claims.235
As a matter of treaty interpretation, the reporters’ notes
fail because they seek not to construe the words “rules of
procedure” according to their ordinary meaning—in which
case the forum non conveniens doctrine clearly qualifies.236
231. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. The full text of Article III
reads as follows:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the
following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than
are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral
awards.
New York Convention, supra note 15, art. III.
233. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 152 and accompanying text; see also DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29 reporters’ note b(ii) (“To the extent
that forum non conveniens represents a ‘rule of procedure,’ as the Supreme
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Instead, the reporters’ notes seek to modify Article III by
introducing a new qualifier that narrows the scope of
application to “purely” procedural rules.237 While one might
possibly argue that the drafters of the New York
Convention intended to give the phrase “rules of procedure”
a specialized, narrow meaning in the context of Article III,238
the burden of proof lies heavily on the party seeking to
establish a specialized meaning.239 In this regard, one
should observe that the presumption cuts against the Draft
Restatement’s position, and reporters’ notes include no
evidence of the Contracting Parties’ intent to give
“procedure” a specialized meaning in the context of Article
III.
In assessing the Draft Restatement’s position on forum
non conveniens, one should also examine the practice of
states parties240 to see whether that practice supports the
interpretation of Article III to exclude the application of
Court held in Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) . . . , Article
III appears to embrace it.”) (emphasis added).
237. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 145 (July
22) (Read, J., dissenting) (“It is my duty to interpret the Declaration and not to
revise it. In other words, I cannot, in seeking to find the meaning of these words,
disregard the words as actually used, give to them a meaning different from
their ordinary and natural meaning, or add words or ideas which were not used
in the making of the Declaration.”) (emphasis added); see also Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages ¶¶ 43-47 (May 31, 2002),
available
at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/pope-phase-36.pdf (involving an effort by
states parties to adopt an “interpretation” of “international law” as only
referring to “customary international law,” observing that none of the forty
negotiating drafts contained a reference to the word “customary,” noting that
“international law” represents a much broader concept than “customary
international law,” and indicating that addition of such a narrowing qualifier
would lie outside the legitimate scope of interpretation); cf. Merrill & Ring
Forestry L.P. v. Canada, Award ¶ 92 (Mar. 31, 2010), available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/Merrill-09.pdf (“As the Investor has argued,
the FTC Interpretation [discussed in Pope & Talbot, supra] seems in some
respect to be closer to an amendment of the treaty, than a strict
interpretation.”).
238. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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rules that (1) combine procedural and substantive aspects,
and (2) regulate access to courts.241 Upon performing that
inquiry, it becomes clear that states parties do not interpret
Article III to establish a blanket prohibition on the
application of such rules. As a first example, one may refer
to statutes of limitations, which (1) have substantive and
procedural aspects,242 (2) regulate access to courts, and (3)
do not represent one of the enumerated grounds to refuse
enforcement of Convention awards. Yet, many states have
adopted statutes of limitations for the enforcement of
arbitral awards. Furthermore, the time limits vary
considerably, ranging from as little as six months in
China,243 to three years in the United States,244 to six years
in England,245 and ten years in Italy.246 Most importantly,
the United States’ relatively short statute of limitations for
Convention awards has defeated enforcement of, or other
reliance on, awards.247 Yet, despite the adoption of these
procedural rules that control access to courts, no one
describes their application as incompatible with Article III

241. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
242. Rick v. Wyeth, Inc., 662 F.3d 1067, 1070 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v.
Russell Sage Coll., 429 N.E.2d 746, 750 (N.Y. 1981)); Joseph v. Athanasopoulos,
648 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith, 429 N.E.2d at 750); Steven I. v.
Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 414 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) (Cabranes, J.,
concurring) (quoting Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886,
892 (2d Cir. 1995)); In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC Sec. Litig., 391
F.3d 401, 409 (2d Cir. 2004). Even the Draft Restatement recognizes that
statutes of limitations can have distinctly substantive dimensions. See DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-32 reporters’ note b
(recognizing that “a statute of limitations may be so bound up in a substantive
right as to be part and parcel of that right”).
243. TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 62, at 410 n.6.
244. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 632 n.36; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE,
supra note 62, at 410 n.6.
245. TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 62, at 410 n.6.
246. Id.
247. Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co v.
Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1993); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 28, 29 (D.D.C. 1999).
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of the New York Convention.248 To the contrary, the Draft
Restatement even embraces them.249
As a second example, one may refer to national rules on
personal jurisdiction, which also (1) have substantive
aspects and procedural aspects,250 (2) regulate access to
courts, and (3) do not represent one of the enumerated
grounds to refuse enforcement of Convention awards. Yet,
no one seriously doubts the authority of states to apply their
own rules on personal jurisdiction to proceedings seeking
the enforcement of Convention awards.251 While the
acceptance of this principle may benefit from a degree of
global consensus on the general standards for personal

248. In fact, it is widely accepted that statutes of limitation represent
procedural devices for purposes of enforcing foreign awards and, therefore, are
governed by the laws of the forum where enforcement is sought. TWEEDDALE &
TWEEDDALE, supra note 62, at 410.
249. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-32 cmt. a(i),
(iii) (“The New York and Panama Conventions do not themselves subject a
confirmation action to a limitations period. An action to confirm a U.S.
Convention award under the Federal Arbitration Act is subject to the three-year
limitations period specified in §§ 207 and 302 of the FAA. . . . As noted, while
the Conventions do not by their terms subject enforcement of awards to a
limitations period, Chapters Two and Three of the FAA do so. An action to
enforce a foreign Convention award is subject to the three-year limitations
period specified in §§ 207 and 302 of the FAA.”).
250. See Bays v. Corcell Inc., 2012 WL 1616746, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. May 8,
2012) (observing that a “Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction involves both procedural and substantive components”); Rose v.
Franchetti, 713 F. Supp. 1203, 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is . .
. more procedural than substantive.”); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 103 (1987) (requiring
consideration of “[t]he procedural and substantive policies of other nations” in
the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction) (emphasis
added).
251. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-27(a) (“The
adequacy of jurisdiction over the defendant in a post-award action is subject to
the generally applicable statutory and constitutional standards governing the
exercise of such jurisdiction.”); BORN, supra note 62, at 2399-00, 2403
(recognizing that national rules on personal jurisdiction “apply, at least to an
extent, in the context of actions to recognize foreign arbitral awards”); LEW ET
AL., supra note 62, at 703 (explaining that “[a]pplications to have foreign awards
declared enforceable require the court to have jurisdiction over the respondent”).

798

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

jurisdiction,252 one continues to encounter unusual cases
that reflect the specificities of national practice.253 More
importantly, the general standards for personal jurisdiction
often include factors that call for the exercise of discretion,254
with the result that courts applying identical standards
produce a multiplicity of outcomes on similar facts.255 In any
case, this represents another situation where states have
accepted as consistent with Article III the application of
national procedural rules that control access to courts,
produce internationally disparate outcomes, and involve the
exercise of discretion.
As a third example, one may refer to the immunities of
foreign states, which also (1) have substantive aspects and
procedural aspects,256 (2) regulate access to courts, and (3)
do not represent one of the enumerated grounds to refuse
enforcement of Convention awards. Yet, there is little
252. See BORN, supra note 62, at 2400 (recognizing a “substantial argument
that the Convention’s requirement that Contracting States recognize foreign
arbitral awards should be interpreted in light of . . . customary jurisdictional
limitations on the judicial powers of Contracting States”) (emphasis added).
253. See id. (citing an unusual case in which Swiss courts refused to enforce an
award rendered in Switzerland against non-Swiss parties “on the grounds that
the award lacked sufficient connection with Switzerland to be enforced there”).
254. See Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 927 (2000) (“As a practical matter,
the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry makes the due process limitation on state court
assertions of personal jurisdiction a matter of discretion, akin to a constitutional
doctrine of forum non conveniens.”).
255. Cf. Flavio Rose, Comment, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction:
The “But For” Test, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1545, 1586 (1994) (“Balancing tests, flexible
standards, and discretion are indeed the correct answer in many legal contexts.
However, they are not the proper approach to personal jurisdiction because the
value of certainty and predictability outweighs the advantage of getting the
‘right’ answer in individual cases.”).
256. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 694 (2004) (asking
whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) “affects substantive
rights . . . or addresses only matters of procedure,” but concluding that “the
FSIA defies such categorization”); Trout v. Sec’y of Navy, 540 F.3d 442, 445
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (relying on Altmann for the proposition that the FSIA “could not
be categorized as exclusively affecting either substantive rights or procedural
matters”); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 667 (6th Cir. 2006)
(discussing Altmann and opining that the FSIA “defied categorization as either
a substantive or procedural provision”).
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reason to think that the New York Convention prohibits the
application of such jurisdictional immunities in appropriate
cases. To begin with, when that convention was adopted in
1958, the “absolute” doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity
remained deeply entrenched in certain legal systems.257
Even the United States, which had just embraced the
“restrictive” doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit,
emphasized that it continued to recognize something close
to absolute immunity from execution against the assets of
foreign states.258 Working in the shadow of this historical
257. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State,
to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26
DEP’T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952) (describing the absolute and restrictive theories of
sovereign immunity as “two conflicting concepts . . . , each widely held and
firmly established”). According to the Tate Letter, courts of Brazil, the British
Commonwealth, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Japan,
Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and members of the Soviet bloc could
be deemed to follow the absolute doctrine of immunity as of 1952. Id. Since the
twenty-four original signatories of the New York Convention included Belarus,
Bulgaria, India, Luxembourg, Pakistan, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Ukraine,
one might reasonably infer that a substantial number of original signatories
followed the absolute doctrine of immunity and likely would not have expected
the New York Convention to require a change of policy as the Convention did
not even mention the topic. See U.N. Comm’n on Trade L., Status: 1958 –
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
NYConvention_status.html (listing the original signatories of the New York
Convention).
Even as of this writing, there remains “a persistent divergence between
adherents of the principle of absolute immunity and that of restrictive
immunity.” BROWNLIE, supra note 138, at 330; see also LEW ET AL., supra note 62,
at 744 (“Some countries still adhere to the doctrine of absolute immunity.”).
258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 460
reporters’ note 1 (“Even after the restrictive theory of immunity from
jurisdiction was adopted by the United States Department of State and the
courts, it was generally supposed that execution against state-owned property
was contrary to international law.”); Denys P. Myers, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 632, 641-43
(1960) (quoting a March 1959 letter from the State Department’s Legal Adviser
to the Attorney General, which expressed the “Department’s view” that “under
international law the property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution
even in a case where the foreign sovereign is not immune from suit”); see also
BROWNLIE, supra note 138, at 330 (“Thus even those states which have accepted
the restrictive principle are in general unwilling to apply it at the level of actual
enforcement by means of the seizure of assets of the debtor state. In other
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background, the drafters of the New York Convention did
not include any textual reference to limitations on foreign
sovereign immunity with the result that the instrument
could not, as a matter of law, have altered the scope of
immunity for purposes of enforcing Convention awards.259
To be sure, the United States has adopted statutory
provisions restricting the scope of foreign sovereign
immunity in actions relating to the confirmation and
enforcement of Convention awards.260 However, the United
States did so not when implementing the New York
Convention in 1970,261 but when amending the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in 1988.262 Even if the New York
words, the adherents of the restrictive principle do not apply it at the more
critical phase of the judicial process.”).
While it is possible to draw a distinction between enforcement of awards and
execution against assets, states have often considered enforcement proceedings
to be part of the execution of an award. LEW ET AL., supra note 62, § 27-50, at
749. Some courts have reached the same conclusion. Id. As explained below, the
European and United Nations Conventions on State Immunity seem to follow
the same basic approach. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
259. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Ship. Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442
(1989) (“Nor do we see how a foreign state can waive its immunity . . . by signing
an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to
suit in United States courts . . . .”); Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendary
Magistrate Ex parte Pinochet Uguarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 217
(appeal taken from Eng.) (“In the light of the foregoing it appears to me to be
clear that, in accordance . . . with international law . . . , a state’s waiver of its
immunity by treaty must . . . always be express. Indeed, if this were not so,
there could well be international chaos as the courts of different state parties to
a treaty reach different conclusions on the question whether a waiver of
immunity was to be implied.”).
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B) (2006) (eliminating immunity in proceedings
“to confirm an award . . . if . . . the . . . award is or may be governed by a treaty
or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards . . . ”); 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), (a)(6)
(2006) (eliminating immunity from execution against the “property of a foreign
state . . . used for a commercial activity in the United States . . . upon a
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State . . . if . . . the
judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against
the foreign state . . .”).
261. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.
262. Professor Dellapenna has elaborated the history of the amendment as
follows:
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and Panama Conventions have influenced U.S. attitudes
toward the proper scope of sovereign immunity in
enforcement proceedings, those developments have not
drawn universal acceptance at the international level.
Viewed from a more global perspective, one continues to
find support for the propositions that consent to arbitration
either (1) does not affect the immunities of foreign states
from recognition and enforcement of awards even in
commercial disputes,263 or (2) at most, restricts the scope of
In interpreting the waiver provision of the Immunities Act, courts split
on whether to follow the congressional dictum in finding that an
agreement to arbitrate anywhere outside the foreign state itself should
be an implied waiver for proceedings in a court here. To resolve this
uncertainty, Congress in 1988 amended the Immunities Act to provide
explicitly for the withdrawal of immunity for . . . arbitral awards if the
arbitration was to take place in the United States or in a country with
which the United States has a treaty requiring enforcement of the . . .
award.
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
349-50 (2d ed. 2003).
263. See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES59/38 (Dec. 2,
2004) [hereinafter UNCIS] (“If a State enters into an agreement in writing with
a foreign natural or juridical person to submit to arbitration differences relating
to a commercial transaction, that State cannot invoke immunity from
jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a
proceeding which relates to: (a) the validity, interpretation or application of the
arbitration agreement; (b) the arbitration procedure; or (c) the confirmation or
setting aside of the award.”) (emphasis added). Lady Hazel Fox explains the
nuances of this provision as follows:
The application of this exception is subject to a number of conditions: . .
. [T]he supervisory powers of the national court from which immunity is
removed cover the adjudication stage of arbitration but stop short of
enforcement of the arbitral award. . . . From this account it will be
apparent that the Convention’s formulation of the arbitration exception
is made subject to a number of limitations which do not appear in
similar exceptions in US, UK and other common law jurisdictions. . . .
The second limitation, the list of the supervisory powers of the court
from which immunity is removed, means that immunity is retained in
respect of proceedings in national courts for recognition and enforcement
of the award. Whilst Article 17 provides a procedure for supervision of
the validity of the arbitration agreement and support for the arbitral
process, it does not extend, as do similar exceptions in US, UK, and
other common law legislation, to the second stage of the recognition and
enforcement of the award. . . . The general conclusion must be that, in
jurisdictions other than the US, UK, and Australia, practitioners at the
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immunity only with respect to courts at the place of
arbitration.264
Furthermore, even to the extent that some instruments
would restrict the immunities of states that have consented
to arbitration of commercial disputes, their scope sometimes
applies only to disputes between states and foreign
nationals.265 Under these circumstances, one can envision
present time should consider that the exception for arbitration
agreements operates solely to remove state immunity from the first
stage of arbitration in which national courts exercise supervisory
powers.
HAZEL FOX Q.C., THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 498-501 (2d ed. 2008) (emphasis
added); see also id. at 496 (observing that “in France there was held to be no
waiver of immunity from execution by consent to an ICC arbitration”).
According to one observer, the European Convention on State Immunity
likewise does not treat agreements to arbitration of commercial disputes as
waivers of immunity from actions for the recognition and enforcement of
awards. See LEW ET AL., supra note 62, at 747 (discussing Article 12 of the
European Convention, which provides that agreements to arbitrate commercial
disputes eliminate immunity for “proceedings relating to: (a) the validity or
interpretation of the arbitration agreement, (b) the arbitration procedure, [and]
(c) the setting aside of the award,” and opining that Article 12 “covers only the
three specified types of proceedings which do not extend to actions for the
recognition and enforcement of awards”).
264. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 4, § 456 cmt.
d (“A question still open under international law is whether an agreement to
arbitrate waives immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts only at the place
chosen as the arbitration site, or is world-wide.”); see also European Convention
on State Immunity, art. 12, May 16, 1972, E.T.S. No. 74 (1972) (“Where a
Contracting State has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration a dispute which
has arisen or may arise out of a civil or commercial matter, that State may not
claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Contracting State on
the territory . . . of which the arbitration has taken or will take place . . . .”)
(emphasis added); LEW ET AL., supra note 62, § 27-42, at 747 (finding it
“questionable whether by entering into an arbitration agreement a state party
intends to waive its immunity for proceedings everywhere in the world”).
265. See UNCIS, supra note 263, art. 17 (“If a State enters into an agreement
in writing with a foreign natural or juridical person to submit to arbitration
differences relating to a commercial transaction, that State cannot invoke
immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise
competent in a proceeding which relates to: (a) the validity, interpretation or
application of the arbitration agreement; (b) the arbitration procedure; or (c) the
confirmation or setting aside of the award.”) (emphasis added); see also FOX,
supra note 263, at 498 (“The application of this exception is subject to a number
of conditions: the arbitrations within the exception are restricted to those made .
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arbitrations between states and their own nationals that
could fall within the scope of the New York Convention,266
but not within instruments removing immunity from any
sort of related judicial processes, including enforcement of
awards.
In any case, the point is that statutes of limitation,
personal jurisdiction, and foreign sovereign immunity all
represent examples of subsequent state practice indicating
that Article III of the New York Convention does not
foreclose the application of national procedural rules that
control access to courts, involve some exercise of discretion,
and produce internationally disparate outcomes.
Turning to the second mistake likely to be made in the
interpretation and application of treaties, namely the
failure to consider the consequences of abusive or
unreasonable exercises of treaty rights in particular cases,267
one finds similar problems with the Draft Restatement’s
treatment of forum non conveniens. As previously discussed,
the reporters’ notes interpret Article III of the New York
Convention as generally prohibiting the application of
national rules that combine substantive and procedural
aspects and, thus, control access to courts.268 From that
broad generalization, the reporters imply that application of
the forum non conveniens doctrine would never comply with
Article III.269 As explained below, however, one can identify
at least two applications of the forum non conveniens
doctrine that seem entirely compatible with the Draft
Restatement’s interpretation of Article III.

. . with foreign persons (arbitrations with a State’s own nationals are excluded) .
. . .”).
266. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
269. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29(a)
(“An action to confirm a U.S. Convention award or enforce a foreign Convention
award is not subject to a stay or dismissal in favor of a foreign court on forum
non conveniens grounds.”); id. reporters’ note b(ii) (taking the position that the
forum non conveniens doctrine “is not available in actions to enforce Convention
awards”).
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First, as observed by the reporters for the Draft
Restatement, the legal framework established by the New
York and Panama Conventions presumes the existence of
the normal situation where courts may enforce awards in
summary proceedings that do not require extensive factual
inquiry.270 When an award creditor voluntarily takes the
proceedings outside that situation by invoking veil-piercing
theories to justify enforcement against parties not named in
the award, disputed factual issues and difficult questions of
foreign law may render it impossible to resolve the issues in
the context of summary proceedings.271 A heated political
context may also render it inappropriate for courts to
become drawn into something that essentially represents a

270. Id. cmt. a (“Actions for post-award relief are ordinarily summary in
nature and do not entail significant fact-finding.”).
271. As the Second Circuit once explained:
While the private interest factors might not ordinarily weigh in favor of
forum non conveniens dismissal in a summary proceeding to confirm an
arbitration award, this case does not lend itself to summary disposition.
Here, Monde Re has brought Ukraine into the proceeding although
Ukraine was not a party to the agreement providing for arbitration. As
noted . . . above, there are various theories under which a non-signer of
an arbitration agreement may be bound by it. However, to cast Ukraine
into liability under any one of these theories requires extensive
discovery and, most probably, a trial of the factual issues implicating
and establishing such non-signer liability. The evidence required for
inquiries of this nature is not to be found in the United States. It
appears that witnesses are beyond the subpoena power of the district
court, that the pertinent documents are in the Ukrainian language and
that enforcement or satisfaction of the arbitral award would not be
easier here than in Ukraine. . . .
The other set of factors to be applied in the analysis are the public
interest factors. These factors include the administrative difficulties
associated with . . . the problems implicated in the application of
foreign law. . . .
Issues governed by the law of Ukraine as well as by Russian law
already have been raised. Ukrainian courts are better suited than
United States courts for the resolution of these legal questions.
Especially important here is the application of Ukrainian law to the
question of whether Ukraine is bound as a non-signer of the NaftogazUkragazprom agreement.
In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v.
Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 500 (2d Cir. 2002).
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dispute between two foreign states about vital national
interests.272
Under the circumstances just described, even the Draft
Restatement accepts the existence of some leeway for courts
to dismiss actions based on national rules that control
access to courts. In so doing, it relies on vaguely stated
principles relating to the “proper” defendant.273 According to
the Draft Restatement, application of those principles may
include a discretionary assessment of whether the
determination of a defendant’s status would “unduly
complicate” the enforcement proceedings based on (1)
availability of witnesses, (2) the need to gather evidence
abroad, as well as (3) language issues in presenting
evidence and the like.274 The similarity to the forum non
conveniens doctrine could hardly be more obvious.275
In any event, the point is that the reporters seem to
accept the existence of situations lying so far outside the
scope of summary proceedings that Article III no longer
prevents the invocation of national rules of procedure
controlling access to courts. However, assuming that the
party seeking enforcement creates a situation that brings
272. See supra notes 170, 176, 180 and accompanying text.
273. As the reporters for the Draft Restatement have observed:
Courts that have ruled on forum non conveniens have sometimes had
other bases for dismissal of the action. For example, the Second Circuit
in Monde Re arguably could have reached the same result without
relying on the forum non conveniens doctrine, but rather by questioning
the proper status of the parties. The court observed that . . . Ukraine,
one of the two defendants, did not participate in the arbitration and
that neither Monegasque nor Naftogaz was a party to the main
contract.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29 reporters’ note
b(ii).
274. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-31(b)
(providing for the discretionary power of courts to decline recognition of a proper
defendant if the determination of status would “unduly complicate” post-award
proceedings); id. reporters’ note c (“Considerations relevant to the potential
increase in complexity of the post-award action include the availability of
witnesses, the need to gather evidence abroad, language issues in presenting
evidence, and the like.”).
275. See supra notes 154-55, 176-81, and accompanying text.
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such rules of procedure back into play, it becomes difficult
to see how Article III might still foreclose the application of
forum non conveniens to such cases.
As a second example, one may assume that the “basic
notion” or general “purpose” of the New York Convention is
to vest award creditors with a treaty-based right to
enforcement of awards without the interposition of national
rules that control access to courts.276 However, even at the
international level, the exercise of treaty rights remains
subject to the doctrine of abuse of rights.277 According to the
WTO’s Appellate Body and other authorities, the doctrine of
abuse of rights encompasses the proposition that parties
have no legal entitlement to the unreasonable or abusive
assertion of treaty rights.278 Viewed from this perspective,
the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine makes
perfect sense even in proceedings to enforce Convention
awards. Consistent with the discussion above, many courts
see the forum non conveniens doctrine not as a general
inquiry into “convenience,”279 but as a tool for preventing the
right of access to the legal process “from becoming an
instrument of abuse, injustice and oppression.”280 Therefore,

276. See supra notes 213-27 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
279. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 224, at 387, 388-89 (emphasizing that
the judicial standard for forum non conveniens dismissals involves not a mere
balancing of convenience, but a showing of “oppressiveness and vexation to a
defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience,” and observing that
the standard also goes beyond convenience to encompass “public interest
factors,” as well as other “substantive assumptions”) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981)). But see DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative
Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-29 reporters’ note b(ii) (suggesting that
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine would introduce mere
“inconvenience” as a basis for dismissing enforcement actions involving
Convention awards).
280. Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985); see also In
re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147,
1153-54 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (observing that the “doctrine of forum non
conveniens rests upon a court’s inherent power to control the parties and cases
before it and to prevent its process from becoming an instrument of abuse or
injustice”), vacated sub nom. Pan Am. World Airways v. Lopez, 491 U.S. 1032
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they generally require a showing that the proceedings
would subject the defendant to “oppressiveness and
vexation . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s
convenience.”281 Alternatively, courts may require a showing
that the proceedings would impose unreasonable burdens
on the enforcing court.282 Either way, the forum non
conveniens doctrine seems easily reconciled with the general
principle that the unreasonable or abusive assertion of
treaty rights destroys the claim to legal entitlement,
including the right to seek enforcement of Convention
awards.
In short, viewed in light of the general principles of
international law, proper application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine does not frustrate the assertion of rights
to enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York and
Panama Conventions. To the contrary, the forum non
conveniens doctrine prevents the abuse or unreasonable use
of treaty rights.283 While conditions may rarely support the
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine to
Convention awards,284 they do arise.285 To be sure, even a
narrow opening for forum non conveniens may result in a
corresponding retreat from absolute certainty when it comes
to the enforcement of Convention awards. However, as once
suggested by Judge Cardozo in a different context, absolute
certainty of enforcement invites abuse,286 and the public
(1989), aff’d in relevant part en banc, 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1989); Simcox v.
McDermott Int’l, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 689, 693 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
281. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 156-60, 280-81, and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
285. See MOSES, supra note 62, at 207 (recognizing that the circumstances in
Monde Re made it “one of those rare cases where application of forum non
conveniens may have been justified”); Neuhaus, supra note 182, at 35
(emphasizing the “highly unusual facts” in Monde Re and concluding that the
decision made “good law”).
286. See Maurice O’Meara Co. v. Nat’l Park Bank of N.Y., 146 N.E. 636, 639,
641 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (involving a claim for payment under a
letter of credit, dissenting from the proposition that the assurance of “prompt
payment against documents” always forecloses consideration of the physical
condition of underlying goods, and emphasizing that the absolute certainty of
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interest in promoting certainty can be no greater than the
public interest in preventing such misconduct.287
VI. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, VACATUR,
AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
As previously observed, the Draft Restatement operates
in a field populated by “givens,” or norms that cannot be
violated or ignored.288 These include “legislation of
reasonably settled meaning.”289 Consequently, the Draft
Restatement must “reconcile itself with . . . the [provisions
of the Federal Arbitration Act], as they stand, with all their
idiosyncrasies and shortcomings.”290 However, when
statutory text is not clear, the Supreme Court has not
spoken, and the lower courts seem divided, the reporters
have substantial leeway to adopt the “best” view, even if
that contradicts the majority view.291 According to the chief
reporter for the Draft Restatement, he and his associate
reporters are “completely liberated” to choose sides in such
cases.292 As explained below, the state of complete liberation
seems difficult to reconcile with ALI practice and the
drafting standard proposed above.
Because Restatements often seek to guide courts,293 the
“ultimate test of any Restatement is its acceptance by the
payment against documents would permit sellers to tender “rags” instead of
conforming goods).
287. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991,
1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (observing that “there is as much public interest in
discouraging fraud as in encouraging the use of letters of credit” to promote
certainty).
288. See supra notes 111, 125, and accompanying text.
289. Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 191.
290. Id. at 193.
291. See Perlman, supra note 18, at 4 (“Where jurisdictions disagree on a
particular point, the Restatements do not purport to count jurisdictions and
adopt the majority rule. Rather, the standard is to adopt the rule that a rational
court, faced with the issue for the first time, would find more persuasive.”).
292. Perry, A Man with Many Hats, supra note 39, at 30 (quoting George
Bermann).
293. See Bermann (N.Y.U.), supra note 6, at 185 (“The central objective of
Restatements is to clarify and consolidate the law for understanding and
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courts.”294 Perhaps for that reason, the drafters of
Restatements typically adopt as their frame of reference the
anticipated views of some hypothetical court,295 which may
be quite different from the views of the reporters or their
advisers, especially in the field of international commercial
arbitration.296 To that extent, the drafters are not
“completely liberated,” but confined to a frame of reference
that may not be their own.
Turning to the specific context of the Draft Restatement
on International Commercial Arbitration, this article has
already proposed a drafting standard based on the
anticipated views of the Supreme Court, as informed by the
Court’s settled jurisprudence on predicate questions such as
the rules of treaty and statutory interpretation.297 As
explained below, the Draft Restatement pays scant
attention to the predicate issue of statutory interpretation,
with the result that it mistakenly endorses the view that
the Federal Arbitration Act fuses the grounds for (1)
vacatur of U.S. Convention awards and (2) refusal to enforce
awards under the New York and Panama Conventions.298
A. Statutory Interpretation
A full account of the Supreme Court’s approach to
statutory interpretation lies beyond the scope of this article.
However, as explained below, there is one principle that the
Court has applied repeatedly when dealing with vague or
outdated statutes in the international context, which lower
courts previously ignored at their peril, but which lower
courts have begun to accept as a fundamental limit on
judicial innovation.

application by U.S. courts.”); Perry, supra note 39 (quoting George Bermann)
(“A restatement is intended to be consulted by the judiciary.”).
294. Perlman, supra note 18, at 6; see also supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
295. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
297. See supra text following note 122.
298. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11(a).
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When interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act,299 courts have struggled to apply the third clause of the
commercial activities exception, which eliminates foreign
sovereign immunity for claims based on the acts of foreign
states outside the United States in connection with their
commercial activities outside the United States, but which
cause a “direct effect in the United States.”300 Given the
ambiguity of the term and the absence of any definition in
the statute or legislative history,301 lower courts have
formulated interpretive standards designed to guide
development of tests to settle the contours of exactly what
qualifies as a “direct effect in the United States.” For
example, in Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(widely regarded as a leading authority in the field of
international commerce)302 interpreted the phrase in light of
what it viewed as “the ultimate FSIA question: [w]ould
Congress have wanted an American court to entertain an
action such as the present one?”303 Based on that criterion,
299. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1610 (2006).
300. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 262, at 229, 231
(“Attorneys have litigated the meaning of the third clause of section 1605(a)(2)
more than any other jurisdictional provision in the Immunities Act without yet
settling . . . its contours. . . . Judicial attempts to define ‘direct effect’ have
produced only the unhelpful generalities.”).
301. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 262, at 230 (“Congress did not provide a
definition of ‘direct effect’ either in the Immunities Act or in its section-bysection analysis.”).
302. See Otto Sandrock, The Choice Between Forum Selection, Mediation and
Arbitration Clauses: European Perspectives, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 7, 13 (2009)
(“Notably . . . , many judgments rendered by . . . the Second Circuit or by the
U.S. Supreme Court are regarded in Europe as examples of a superb legal
culture in international commercial matters.”).
303. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 941 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added), aff’d, 504 U.S. 607 (1992); see also Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v.
Derderian, 872 F.2d 281, 286 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The dispositive question is
whether the effect is sufficiently direct and sufficiently in the United States that
Congress would have wanted an American court to hear the case.”) (citing Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982)); Harris Corp. v. Nat’l Iranian Radio &
Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Essentially, the question
presented is, ‘was the effect sufficiently “direct” and sufficiently “in the United
States” that Congress would have wanted an American court to hear the case?”).
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the Second Circuit concluded that Congress would want to
preserve the status of New York City as a leading
commercial center and, to that end, would regard the failure
to make a scheduled bond payment in New York as having a
“direct effect in the United States.”304 Although a unanimous
Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the particular
default qualified as a “direct effect in the United States,” it
also criticized the Second Circuit’s view of the “ultimate
question” in statutory construction:
The Court of Appeals concluded that the rescheduling of the
[bonds’] maturity dates obviously had a ‘direct effect’ on
respondents. It further concluded that that effect was sufficiently
‘in the United States’ for purposes of the FSIA, in part because
‘Congress would have wanted an American court to entertain this
action’ in order to preserve New York City’s status as ‘a
preeminent commercial center.’ The question, however, is not
what Congress ‘would have wanted’ but what Congress enacted in
305
the FSIA.

Perhaps because (1) the Supreme Court affirmed the
Second Circuit’s judgment in Weltover, (2) the Supreme
Court’s criticism might be viewed as dicta, and (3) the
intensity of that criticism might be open to debate, the
Second Circuit and other courts of appeal continued to use
“what Congress would have wanted” as a focal point for
statutory construction when trying to fill holes in aging
statutes, at least in the context of international commerce.
As a prime example, one may cite the extraterritorial (i.e.,
overseas) application of U.S. laws regulating securities
fraud. Because Congress likely did not consider the topic
when drafting the relevant statutes during the 1930s, their
texts and legislative histories have virtually nothing to say
on extraterritorial application.306 To fill that void in an
increasingly global financial system,307 the Second Circuit
304. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
305. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618-19 (citation omitted).
306. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 663-64 & n.5 (7th Cir.
1998), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2870
(2010).
307. See Robinson v. TCI/US West Cable Commc’ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905
(5th Cir. 1997) (describing the court’s task of determining jurisdiction as
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developed (and other courts endorsed) the so-called
“conduct” and “effects” tests for extraterritorial application
based on judicial perceptions of what Congress would have
wanted if it had considered the problem:
Although the circuits that have confronted the matter seem to
agree that there are some transnational situations to which the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws are applicable,
agreement appears to end at that point. Identification of those
circumstances that warrant such regulation has produced a
disparity of approach, to some degree doctrinal and to some degree
attitudinal, as the courts have striven to implement, in Judge
Friendly’s words, “what Congress would have wished if these
problems had occurred to it.”
These efforts have produced two basic approaches to determining
whether the transaction in question ought to be subject to
American securities fraud regulation. . . . Specifically, one
approach focuses on the domestic conduct in question, and the
other focuses on the domestic effects resulting from the
308
transaction at issue.

By definition, speculation about “what Congress would
have wished if these problems had occurred to it” involves
not statutory interpretation, but policy decisions about
matters that Congress never really considered.309

“‘fill[ing] the void’ created by a combination of congressional silence and the
growth of international commerce since the Exchange Act was passed. . . .”).
308. Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878-81
(recounting the development of jurisprudence among lower courts “over many
decades”).
309. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 664 (observing that “some courts have admitted
candidly that . . . policy considerations and the courts’ best judgment have been
utilized to determine the reach of the federal securities laws”); Cont’l Grain
(Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 416 (8th Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that a decision regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities laws was “largely based on policy considerations”), abrogated by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977)
(recognizing that the exercise “in a large measure calls for a policy decision . . .
.”), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869; see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2880 (describing lower court jurisprudence in terms of a “fundamental
methodology of balancing interests and arriving at what seemed the best policy .
. .”).
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Despite roughly four decades of consistent application
by lower courts,310 the Supreme Court overruled the
“conduct” and “effects” tests for extraterritorial application
of U.S. securities laws in 2010.311 Along the way, it criticized
the Second Circuit’s interpretive approach as lacking any
grounding in textual or extratextual sources, 312 chastised
lower courts for essentially making policy determinations on
issues that Congress never considered,313 and condemned
the effort to divine “what Congress would have wanted if it
had thought of the situation” as “judicial-speculation-madelaw.”314
In short, when it comes to statutory construction, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed the view that
courts must “give the statute the effect its language
suggests, however modest that may be; [and] not . . . extend
it to admirable purposes it might be used to achieve.”315 By
all indications, lower courts have taken heed.316 However, as
310. As Justice Stevens observed:
The Second Circuit’s test became the “north star” of § 10(b)
jurisprudence. With minor variations, other courts converged on the
same basic approach. . . . “The longstanding acceptance by the courts,
coupled with Congress’ failure to reject [its] reasonable interpretation
of the wording of § 10(b), . . . argues significantly in favor of acceptance
of the [Second Circuit] rule by this Court.”
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2889-91 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (alteration in original)).
311. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883-88.
312. See id. at 2879 (“The Second Circuit never put forth a textual
extratextual basis for these tests. As early as Bersch, it confessed
were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the
history, that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable to
(quoting Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993).

or even an
that ‘if we
legislative
respond.’”)

313. See id. at 2880.
314. Id. at 2881.
315. Id. at 2886.
316. See, e.g., Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2012)
(explaining that prior cases had “erroneously disregarded” Supreme Court
jurisprudence by attempting to divine “what Congress would have wanted,”
noting that the Supreme Court “unequivocably repudiated” policy-driven
interpretive models not grounded in textual and extratextual sources, and
concluding that “[e]very court to consider [such matters] after Morrison has
embraced” its holding and applied it to other relevant statutes); SEC v. Ficeto,
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explained below, the Draft Restatement omits any mention
of Weltover or Morrison, pays scant attention to text and
extratextual evidence of Congress’s intent regarding
vacatur of U.S. Convention awards, and relies almost
entirely on policy arguments to achieve a better alignment
between the Federal Arbitration Act and a global
convergence on the standards for vacatur of Convention
awards.
B. Vacatur
Often referred to as annulment or set-aside,317 vacatur
represents a process whereby the losing party to an
arbitration applies for nullification of the award by courts at
the place of arbitration.318 According to the traditional view,
each court applies its own national standards for vacatur,319
which may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 320
893 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasizing that the Morrison
Court “repeatedly stated that it was attempting to apply the Act in a way that
effectuates the purpose of the statute, as expressed in the text of the Act itself,”
and that the Court was “deeply troubled by lower courts’ use of ‘judicialspeculation-made-law—divining what Congress would have wanted if it had
thought of the situation before the court”) (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2881); In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495 (RMB), 2010 WL
3910286, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (relying on “Morrison’s admonition
against ‘using congressional silence as a justification for judge-made rules’”)
(quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881).
317. See MOSES, supra note 62, at 193; see also BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62,
at 585-86.
318. LEW ET AL., supra note 62, at 664, 665, 667; MOSES, supra note 62, at 193 &
n.1; see also BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 585-86, 591; BORN, supra note 62,
at 2337, 2676. There is “one notable exception” to the general rule that vacatur
may be sought only at the place of arbitration. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62,
at 591. Where the parties have exercised the “freedom to subject the arbitration
to the procedural law of a country other than that in which the arbitration is
held,” the courts of the country that supplies the procedural law may also vacate
the award. Id. at 591-92. However, because the exercise of that freedom “seems .
. . unnecessary and unhelpful for [the] parties,” most observers regard the
possibility as “more theoretical than real.” Id. at 591; see also VAN DEN BERG,
supra note 198, at 350.
319. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 650; BORN, supra note 62, at 2568;
MOSES, supra note 62, at 193.
320. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 650-51; BORN, supra note 62, at 2568.
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Textually, the New York Convention validates this
approach in Article V(1)(e), which makes it a ground to
refuse enforcement in any state party if the award already
has been “set aside . . . by a competent authority of the
country in which . . . that award was made.”321 This
provision recognizes the continuing availability of vacatur
at the place of arbitration as distinct from the refusal to
enforce awards under the New York Convention.322
Likewise, because Article V(1)(e) has nothing to say about
the grounds that courts should apply to set-aside actions at
the place of arbitration,323 the universally held view is that
the courts of states parties should apply their own national
standards.324 In other words, the New York Convention
321. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(1)(e).
322. As explained by one observer:
Courts have sometimes confused the two actions--an action to vacate
and an action to enforce. It is possible, in some instances, to bring both
actions in the same court. If . . . the arbitration were held in the United
States, and the losing party’s assets were also in the United States, the
U.S. court could hear both a motion to vacate and a motion to enforce.
Normally, however, the parties will have chosen a neutral situs for the
arbitration, so the losing party’s assets are likely to be in a jurisdiction
other than the one where the arbitration is held. Thus, the motion to
vacate will take place in the court of the situs, but the motion to enforce
will be in the jurisdiction where the relevant assets are located. . . .
Under the [New York] Convention, a court is only empowered to
recognize or enforce an award, not to vacate it.
When a party succeeds in having an award vacated in the court where
the arbitration took place, the traditional view is that such an award
has no further legal force or effect, and cannot be enforced in any other
jurisdiction. . . . The effect is different, however, for an award for which
enforcement has been refused. When an award is not enforced, unlike a
vacated award, it is not annulled. Rather, if assets of the award debtor
are available in more than one jurisdiction, then the award creditor
who did not succeed in enforcing the award in the first jurisdiction can
pursue the award in a second jurisdiction, perhaps with better results.
MOSES, supra note 62, at 194, 213.
323. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22 (2d
Cir. 1997); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 650; BORN, supra note 62, at 255253, 2637; LEW ET AL., supra note 62, at 666.
324. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d at 22; BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 650;
BORN, supra note 62, at 2338, 2552-53, 2555-56; MOSES, supra note 62, at 193; see
also Richard W. Hulbert, The Case for a Coherent Application of Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 45, 79-80 (2011) (conceding that
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requires no international consistency of standards for
vacatur, either (1) among states parties, or (2) between their
laws and the New York Convention’s grounds for refusing
enforcement of awards. As a result, the Convention retreats
from predictability in the sense that it makes vacatur on
possibly eccentric national grounds a predicate for
worldwide refusal under Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Convention.325
In an international commercial setting that thrives on
uniformity and predictability,326 the New York Convention’s
omission of uniform rules for vacatur may be undesirable as
a matter of policy.327 Perhaps for this reason, recent decades
have witnessed an informal, global convergence around a
range of vacatur grounds involving procedural flaws and
infringements on public policy,328 and thus, loosely tracking
the grounds for refusal to enforce awards under the New
“[t]he delegates to the 1958 New York Conference necessarily recognized that
the Convention did not, and could not, control the application of the law of the
seat to [vacatur of] an award rendered in its territory”).
325. MOSES, supra note 62, at 214 (describing the “large loophole” created by
the “possibility that a local court will vacate an award on a ground that is not
among the narrow grounds listed in Article V of the [New York] Convention,”
with the consequence that “most Contracting States will refuse to enforce the
award, because it was vacated under the law of the country where it was
rendered”).
Adding another layer of unpredictability, some jurisdictions have concluded that
they retain the discretion to enforce awards that have been vacated at the place
of arbitration. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 650; BORN, supra note 62, at
2553; MOSES, supra note 62, at 214; LEW ET AL., supra note 62, at 717. As a
result, an award vacated at the place of arbitration might be refused
enforcement in a second jurisdiction, but enforced in a third. BLACKABY ET AL.,
supra note 62, at 650. This hardly represents a satisfying state of affairs.
326. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (indicating
that “orderliness and predictability” are “essential to any international business
transaction”); Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 77 (1992) (observing that “international business
transactions require stability and predictability to be successful”).
327. See LEW ET AL., supra note 62, at 716 (quoting Jan Paulsson, The Case for
Disregarding LSA’s (Local Standard Annulments) Under the New York
Convention, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 99 (1996)) (observing that Article V(1)(e) “has
been criticized as it allows for ‘local standards of annulment’”).
328. MOSES, supra note 62, at 194.
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York Convention.329 Furthermore, widespread adoption of
the UNCITRAL Model Law has reinforced that convergence
because it supplies not just similar, but identical, standards
for vacatur that have been pegged directly to the New York
Convention’s grounds for refusal to enforce awards.330 Thus,
with every new adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law,331
the world advances toward a community in which standards
for vacatur have become fused horizontally (among states)
and vertically (between national standards for vacatur and
international standards for refusing enforcement of awards
under the New York Convention), both of which produce
gains in uniformity, predictability, and the perceived
suitability of states as venues for arbitration.

329. BORN, supra note 62, at 2552 (indicating that “most developed national
arbitration regimes have adopted broadly similar approaches to the available
grounds for annulment of international arbitral awards—generally, but not
always, limiting such review to bases paralleling those applicable to nonrecognition of awards in Article V of the New York Convention”); id. at 2568
(asserting that “arbitration statutes in most major trading states provide only
limited grounds for seeking to annul international arbitral awards[;] [s]uch
legislation typically permits [annulment] only on grounds analogous to those set
out in Articles V(1) and V(2) of the New York Convention”); LEW ET AL., supra
note 62, at 663 (observing that “[t]he grounds for challenging an award are often
comparable with the grounds referred to in the New York Convention for
purposes of refusing enforcement”).
330. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 62, at 595 (noting that the Model law
“has . . . been adopted into, or at the very least has inspired, national arbitration
legislation around the world” and observing that its grounds for vacatur “are
taken from Article V of the New York Convention”); BORN, supra note 63, at
2568 (explaining that “the drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law sought to
‘mirror’ and were ‘eager to align’ the grounds for annulment of an award under .
. . the Model Law with those for non-recognition of an award in Article V of the
New York Convention”) (quoting Report of the Secretary-General on the Possible
Features of A Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/207, ¶ 110, XII Y.B. UNCITRAL 75 (1981)).
331. See U.N. Comm’n on Trade L., Status: UNCITRAL Model Law,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitr
ation_status.html (last visited May 27, 2013) (identifying sixty-six states in
which the UNCITRAL Model Law has been adopted by national or sub-national
governments); see also MOSES, supra note 62, at 193 (observing that the
standards for vacatur “will be based on the UNCITRAL Model Law” in “over
fifty jurisdictions”).
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C. Federal Arbitration Act
Turning to the United States, which has not adopted
the UNCITRAL Model Law at the national level, the
question becomes the degree to which the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) lags behind, or falls in step with, the
global convergence of vacatur standards around the grounds
for refusal to enforce awards under the New York
Convention. As set forth below, plausible arguments can be
made for either view, depending on how one interprets the
interplay between Chapter One of the FAA (which generally
applies to domestic arbitrations) and Chapters Two and
Three (which implement the New York and Panama
Conventions, respectively). Both arguments accept that one
must begin with 9 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 208, which provide as
follows:
Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the
Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any
court having jurisdiction under this chapter for an order
confirming the award as against any other party to the
arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one
of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement
332
of the award specified in the said Convention.
Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this
chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with this
333
chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States.

According to the first line of argument, the
implementing legislation contained in 9 U.S.C. § 207 tracks
the New York Convention in the sense that it only regulates
the recognition and enforcement of Convention awards and
has nothing to say about the standards for vacatur of
Convention awards rendered in the United States.334 To fill
332. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006); see also 9 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (incorporating this
provision into the implementing legislation for the Inter-American, or Panama,
Convention).
333. 9 U.S.C. § 208 (2006); see also 9 U.S.C. § 307 (2006) (“Chapter 1 applies to
actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter 1
is not in conflict with this chapter or the Inter-American Convention as ratified
by the United States.”).
334. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(i).
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the silence on vacatur grounds left by § 207 and the treaty,
9 U.S.C. § 208 further tracks the New York Convention by
calling for the application of the FAA’s domestic provisions
on vacatur,335 namely:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
336
subject matter submitted was not made.

This seems to represent the view taken by the Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits,337 and
335. Id.
336. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
337. See Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1368 n. 4 (D.C. Cir.
2012); Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of
Account, 618 F.3d 277, 295 (3d Cir. 2010); Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg.
Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Hall St. Assoc.
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); see also Karaha Bodas Co., v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc. 126
F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997) for the proposition that “[t]he Convention ‘mandates
very different regimes for the review of arbitral awards (1) in the [countries] in
which, or under the law of which, the award was made, and (2) in other
[countries] where recognition and enforcement are sought’”) (emphasis added);
Lander Co. v. MPP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the
argument that “the New York Convention was intended to be exclusive within
its domain” because “[n]othing in the Convention or its history, or in the
implementing legislation or its history, suggests exclusivity,” and therefore,
concluding that Congress probably intended the New York Convention and the
FAA’s domestic provisions on vacatur to have an overlapping scope); Toys “R”
Us, Inc., 126 F.3d at 23; DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note
5, § 4-11 reporters’ note a(iii) (attributing this view to the Second, Third, and
Sixth Circuits); Hulbert, supra note 324, at 83-84 (attributing this view to the
Second and Sixth Circuits, but also observing that the Seventh Circuit accepted
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evidently tracks the logic of the New York Convention,
which represents the customary function of implementing
legislation.338
According to the second argument, 9 U.S.C. § 207
represents a blanket statement that U.S. courts must
confirm U.S. Convention awards unless the resisting part
establishes one of the Convention’s enumerated grounds for
refusal to enforce awards.339 Because those grounds include
vacatur by courts at the place of arbitration, vacatur
remains available as a remedy.340 However, because § 207
absolutely requires confirmation unless the resisting party
establishes one of the grounds actually “specified” in the
Convention,341 § 208 blocks application of the grounds
specified only in 9 U.S.C. §10(a).342 This represents the view
the reasoning in dicta, and recognizing that Seventh Circuit jurisprudence also
seems “consistent” with this view).
338. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (“The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in
United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”); S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 1
(1970) (“The purpose of S. 3274 . . . is to implement the [New York] Convention .
. . . The bill would create a new chapter under . . . (the Federal Arbitration Act)
dealing exclusively with the recognition and enforcement of awards pursuant to
the provisions of the convention.”) (emphasis added); J. Logan Murphy, Note,
Law Triangle: Arbitrating International Reinsurance Disputes Under the New
York Convention, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and Antagonistic State Law, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1535, 1552 (2008) (“In the case of the Convention,
Congress enacted implementing legislation in order to make the provisions of
the Convention enforceable in the courts of the United States.”) (emphasis
added); see also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650, 655,
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (accepting “the proposition that the Congress, in the guise of
ratifying or implementing the Convention, could not include provisions contrary
to the express and unambiguous enactments of the latter instrument”), aff’d,
710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
339. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(i).
340. Id.
341. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
342. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tenative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(i) (“Under this reading, allowing U.S. courts to vacate U.S.
Convention awards is consistent with FAA Chapters Two and Three, but
allowing use of the grounds set out in FAA Chapter One is not, since it is
inconsistent with Section 207’s requirement that Convention awards be
‘confirmed’ unless a New York Convention ground is established.”).
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of the Eleventh Circuit.343 However, that court obviously
misinterpreted the authorities on which it relied in the
sense that they involved enforcement of foreign awards, as
opposed to vacatur of U.S. Convention awards.344 Also, the
argument evidently does not track the logic of the New York
Convention as drafted in 1958,345 but the normative desire
for the global convergence of vacatur standards that
developed in subsequent decades.346
Starting with Preliminary Draft No. 5, the Draft
Restatement has openly aligned itself with the Eleventh
Circuit’s assertion that U.S. courts may vacate U.S.
Convention awards only on the same grounds set forth in
Article V of the New York Convention,347 even though that
instrument does not, in fact, purport to regulate vacatur.348
In so doing, the reporters either have not consulted, or have
not followed, many of the sources normally applied by the
Supreme Court to statutory interpretation. For example, in
their first exposition of the topic, the reporters elaborated a
textual basis for each of the arguments regarding the proper
interpretation of 9 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 208,349 but did not even
weigh the relative strengths of either view. In subsequent
drafts, the reporters amended their work to recognize that
“both interpretations of § 207 are plausible,” but declared
that the Draft Restatement “adopts the [Eleventh Circuit’s]
interpretation as more consistent with FAA Chapter 2 as

343. See Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1441-42, 1446 (11th Cir. 1998); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No.
2), supra note 5, § 4-11 reporters’ note a(iii).
344. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(iii) (“It should be noted that both of the cases cited by the
Eleventh Circuit as authority appear to have involved foreign Convention
awards, not Convention awards made in the United States.”) (emphasis added).
345. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
347. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 5), supra note 214, § 411(a); id. cmt. a; id. reporters’ note a.
348. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
349. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 5), supra note 214, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(i).
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whole.”350 Departing from the Supreme Court’s approach to
statutory interpretation in Morrison, however, the reporters
still did not identify specific textual or contextual bases for
preferring the Eleventh Circuit’s view. Had they closely
examined text and context, the reporters should have
concluded that § 207 does not affect the grounds for vacatur
of U.S. Convention awards because the text of that
provision (1) makes no reference to standards for vacatur351
and (2) implements a treaty provision that does not regulate
standards for vacatur.352
Turning to extratextual sources, such as legislative
history, one should pause to recall that the reporters once
described their task as determining “what Congress
intended in enacting” 9 U.S.C. § 207.353 At that stage,
however, the Draft Restatement curiously omitted any
reference to the drafting history for § 207, which repeatedly
emphasizes that Chapter 2 of the FAA deals “exclusively”
with “recognition and enforcement [as opposed to vacatur] of
awards,”354 including the inextricably related topics of
jurisdiction,355 venue,356 and removal in enforcement
proceedings,357 as well as the implementation of the New
York Convention’s express provisions on enforcement of
arbitration agreements.358 Likewise, the drafting history for
350. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(i); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3, 2011), supra note
75, § 4-11 reporters’ note a(i).
351. See 9 U.S.C. § 207.
352. See supra notes 323, 334 and accompanying text.
353. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 5), supra note 214, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(iii).
354. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 1 (1970) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602; S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 1 (1970) (emphasis added).
355. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2, reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602; S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 2.
356. 9 U.S.C. § 204 (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2, reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602; S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 2.
357. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2, reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602; S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 2.
358. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (2006); see also New York Convention, supra note 15, art.
II(3) (requiring states parties to refer parties to arbitration).
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§ 207 emphasizes that it “deals with two problems relating
to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards”: a three-year
statute of limitations and incorporation of specific grounds
to refuse enforcement of Convention awards.359
Following correspondence between the author and the
reporters relating to the omission of drafting history,
subsequent versions of the Draft Restatement have
addressed the topic and have even recognized that the
drafting history “might be construed as indicating that
Chapter 2 does not address the grounds for vacating (rather
than recognizing and enforcing) awards.”360 Nevertheless,
the Draft Restatement rejects that view based on the
proposition that the drafting history simply “does not
address the grounds for vacating U.S. Convention
awards,”361 perhaps meaning that the reporters regard
silence as a neutral factor. Following the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Morrison, however, the absence of any
reference to vacatur in § 207 (or in any provision of FAA
Chapter 2), plus the absence of any reference to vacatur in
the drafting history (despite the fact that the United States
had a committee of experts working on the implementing
legislation for about a year),362 seems dispositive on the fact
that Congress never contemplated special standards for
vacatur of U.S. Convention awards.363 Given the complete
absence of grounding in textual or extratextual sources, it
seems fanciful to suggest that Congress historically
intended to provide special regulations for vacatur of U.S.
359. See S. REP. NO. 91-702, Appendix at 5, 8 (Hearing Held Before the Comm.
on Foreign Relations on Feb. 9, 1970) (Statement of Richard D. Kearney)
[hereinafter Kearney Statement of 1970].
360. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(ii); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-11 reporters’ note a(ii).
361. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(ii); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-11 reporters’ note a(ii).
362. Kearney Statement of 1970, supra note 359, at 9-10.
363. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-79 (2010)
(criticizing statutory interpretation not grounded in textual or extratextual
sources, and rejecting the lower courts’ treatment of silence as an invitation to
construe statutes based almost solely on judicial perceptions of desirable policy).
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Convention awards. Perhaps for this reason, subsequent
iterations of the Draft Restatement quietly dropped the
express aspiration of trying to determine what “Congress
intended in enacting” § 207.364
Given the almost complete lack of support in textual
and extratextual sources, the reporters rely heavily on
policy arguments to justify their construction of 9 U.S.C. §
207 as mandating the fusion of the grounds for vacatur with
the grounds for refusing to enforce U.S. Convention
awards.365 For example, they contend:
Using the Convention grounds for vacatur of U.S. Convention
awards would unify the grounds for vacatur with the grounds for
denying confirmation of these awards . . . . Such uniformity would
benefit foreign parties arbitrating in the United States, who would
be facing a regime for review of arbitral awards with which they
are familiar and which is simpler, thus enhancing the
366
attractiveness of the U.S. as an arbitral forum.

While perhaps compelling from a normative perspective,
and helpful in the sense of improving the alignment
between the Federal Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL
Model Law (which also fuses the grounds for vacatur and

364. Compare DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Preliminary Draft No. 5), supra note 214,
§ 4-11 reporters’ note a(iii) (“The issue . . . is what Congress intended in enacting
Section 207.”), with DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, §
4-11 reporters’ note a(iv) (“The issue here, however, is not how to construe the
New York and Panama Conventions but instead how to construe § 207.
Congress certainly was free to go beyond the Conventions and to revise the
grounds for vacating Convention awards made in the United States when
implementing the Conventions, even if the Conventions themselves did not
require it to do so. For the [policy] reasons stated above, the Restatement takes
the position that, under § 207, the grounds for vacating U.S. Convention awards
are the Convention grounds rather than the FAA § 10 grounds.”), and DRAFT
RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, § 4-11 reporters’ note a(iv)
(same).
365. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(iv); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-11 reporters’ note a(iv).
366. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(iv); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-11 reporters’ note a(iv).
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refusal to enforce awards),367 this statement seems puzzling
on at least three levels.
First, when viewed from the perspective of the Supreme
Court’s views on statutory construction, the emphasis on
building the United States’ reputation as an arbitral venue
seems no more defensible than the Second Circuit’s
emphasis on preserving New York City’s reputation as a
“preeminent commercial center,”368 a policy-oriented
approach toward statutory construction that the Supreme
Court rejected in Weltover.369 Furthermore, to the extent
that one views the historical intention of Congress as the
overriding criterion in statutory construction,370 one should
bear in mind not only the lack of grounding in traditional
sources,371 but also the absurdity of implying that a
Congress historically slow to embrace the New York
Convention due to concerns about unintended changes to
U.S. arbitration law372 would have leapt to the forefront of
367. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
368. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 941 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1991), aff’d,
504 U.S. 607 (1992).
369. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
370. See id. (“The question . . . is not what Congress ‘would have wanted’ but
what Congress enacted in the FSIA.”); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank,
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2880 (2010) (“[R]ather than courts’ ‘divining what
“Congress would have wished” if it had addressed the problem[, a] more natural
inquiry might be what jurisdiction Congress actually thought about and
conferred.’”) (quoting with approval Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d
27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
371. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (lamenting the fact that the “Second
Circuit never put forward a textual or even extratextual basis” for the
development of jurisprudence regarding the extraterritorial effect of U.S.
statutes prohibiting securities fraud).
372. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-10 (Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards),
Appendix at 4 (Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations on Sept. 20,
1968) (Statement of Richard D. Kearney) [hereinafter Kearney Statement of
1968] (“Although the United States participated in the Conference, the
delegation recommended against signature of the convention. The delegation
referred in its report to the common law hostility to arbitration and to the lack
of widespread support among the business community for the convention.”);
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571, 576
(7th Cir. 2007) (“A United States delegation participated in the 1958
negotiations; however, that delegation recommended against the United States
becoming an original signatory to the Convention. In part, the delegation was
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global convergence by anticipating, in 1970, the Model
Law’s fusion of standards for vacatur and refusal, in 1985,
without even mentioning that gigantic leap forward. 373
Second, even if one could still construe statutes based
on speculation about how Congress might invest its time
today, it seems unlikely that a Congress recently described
as hostile to arbitration374 would consider refinement of the
FAA to mirror the UNCITRAL Model Law as a worthy use
concerned that the Convention would ‘override the arbitration laws of a
substantial number of States and entail changes in State and possibly Federal
court procedures.’”) (quoting U.S. DEL. REP. 22, at 2).
Tellingly, while members of the internationally minded legal elite pushed for
adoption of the New York Convention since the early 1960s, the Senate did not
give its advice and consent until 1968. See Kearney Statement of 1968, supra at
4 (“The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association recommended
accession on September 1, 1960. The Board of Directors of the American
Arbitration Association in 1966 strongly endorsed the convention and pressed
for its submission for Senate advice and consent.”).
Even after that, the United States did not submit its instrument of ratification
until after Congress enacted implementing legislation in 1970. See Kearney
Statement of 1970, supra note 359, at 5 (“During the hearing before the Foreign
Relations Committee on United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards the question if [sic] implementing
legislation was discussed and it was made clear that the United States would
not deposit its instrument of accession until the necessary implementing
legislation had been enacted. The bill which is presently before you sets up the
legal structure that is required to implement the Convention.”); see also
Kearney Statement of 1968, supra at 2 (“Changes in the Federal Arbitration Act
. . . will be required before the United States becomes party to the convention.
Accordingly, the President’s letter of transmittal states that U.S. accession . . .
will be executed ‘only after the necessary legislation is enacted.’”). Significantly,
one may attribute the delay to the preoccupation with drafting an entirely new
chapter of the Federal Arbitration Act to reduce the likelihood of unintended
changes to domestic arbitration law. See Kearney Statement of 1970, supra note
359, at 5; see also H.G. Torbert, Jr., Acting Asst. Sec’y for Cong. Relations, Dep’t
of State, Letter to Hon. John. W. McCormack, Speaker, House of Reps. (Dec. 3,
1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N at 3603 (“The consensus . . . was that
rather than amending a series of sections of the Federal Arbitration Act it would
be preferable to enact a new chapter dealing exclusively with recognition and
enforcement of awards falling under the Convention. This approach would leave
unchanged the largely settled interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act [for
proceedings] not [falling] under the Convention.”) (emphasis added).
373. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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of time. Even the chief reporter for the Draft Restatement
recently conceded as much:
That our work takes the form of a restatement rather than a
legislative text is not accident. . . . Crucially, a restatement doesn’t
need to be voted on by Congress. . . . The FAA certainly needs to
be revised. No one can defend it as written. . . . Of course, it would
be better to have a good federal statute rather than a restatement
based upon a lousy old federal statute, but I don’t see that as
happening anytime soon. Frankly, there’s no constituency for a
new and comprehensive legislative framework for international
arbitration, and there’s no guarantee that what would emerge
from the U.S. legislative process would be a satisfactory text.
More and more young lawyers may be finding arbitration very
attractive professionally for a number of reasons, but that doesn’t
mean Congress regards FAA reform on the same level as
“Obamacare,” legalizing marijuana, or immigration reform. No
one is going to get elected because he or she sponsored the
“Federal Arbitration Revision Act of 2012.” So, at least for now,
we’re stuck, at best, with a restatement. 375

Third, the emphasis on “enhancing the attractiveness of
the U.S. as an arbitral forum”376 seems difficult to square
with the reporters’ previous writings, which declared that
“[t]he purpose of the Restatement is not to promote the
United States as a seat of international arbitration . . . .”377
One wonders how they have come to embrace a goal once
previously described as off limits.
Anyhow, the point is that when it comes to the proposed
fusion of grounds for vacatur and refusal, the Draft
Restatement relies almost entirely on the sort of policy
justifications already rejected by the Supreme Court as a
foundation for statutory construction. In the process, it
illustrates the perils of speculation that the Supreme Court
sought to avoid by emphasizing objectively verifiable
sources of, or at least stable presumptions regarding,

375. Perry, A Man with Many Hats, supra note 39, at 30 (quoting George
Bermann).
376. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(iv); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-11 reporters’ note a(iv).
377. Bermann et al. (PENN. ST.), supra note 6, at 1341 (emphasis added).
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congressional intent.378 As a result, the Draft Restatement
invites judicial repudiation of its proposed fusion of grounds
for vacatur and refusal of U.S. Convention awards, not
because it pursues inappropriate policies, but because it
inappropriately substitutes policymaking for genuine
statutory construction.379
Lacking textual and extratextual support for their
interpretation of 9 U.S.C. § 207, the Draft Restatement’s
reporters fall back on contextual observations about its
interplay with 9 U.S.C. § 202, which extends the
Convention’s scope beyond “foreign awards” to include
international awards rendered in the United States that
arise out of legal relationships having reasonable
connections to foreign jurisdictions.380 According to their
view:
More generally, it seems anomalous for the U.S. to have by
legislation accepted the Conventions’ invitation to Contracting
States to treat awards made on its territory as Convention
awards, and then withhold from them application of the grounds
for denial of recognition and enforcement that represent the
381
Conventions’ centerpiece.”

But however things may seem from an overly general
perspective, the observation bears little resemblance to the
truth following close examination of §§ 202 and 207.
Turning first to § 202, the Draft Restatement’s discussion of
policy seems to regard statutory extension of the
378. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
379. Id. at 2880-81; Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
380. The New York Convention applies both to foreign awards (being those
rendered outside the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought) and to nondomestic awards (being those rendered in the enforcement forum, but still
considered non-domestic in that forum). New York Convention, supra note 15,
art. I(1). The U.S. implementing legislation for that provision defines
Convention awards to include those arising out of commercial relationships
involving at least one foreign party or some other reasonable relationship to
foreign jurisdictions. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). In other words, the United
States has by statute extended the Convention’s scope to many awards rendered
in the United States. See id.
381. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(iv) (emphasis added); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No.
3), supra note 75, § 4-11 reporters’ note a(iv) (emphasis added).
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Convention’s scope as logically indicative of Congress’s
intent to alter the grounds for vacating U.S. Convention
awards in a manner likely to increase the nation’s
attraction as an arbitration venue.382 Even if it has a degree
of superficial plausibility, the argument fails to
acknowledge that § 202 does not mention vacatur and only
purports to define the universe of awards that “fall[] under
the Convention,”383 which itself does not regulate vacatur
and leaves that topic to specification by domestic law.384
Under these circumstances it seems difficult to understand
how the statutory extension of the Convention’s scope might
restrict, even indirectly, the grounds for vacatur of U.S.
Convention awards.
In addition, proponents of the Draft Restatement’s
treatment of 9 U.S.C. § 202 seem to rely on the assumption
that Congress adopted a broad statutory definition of
Convention awards and,385 therefore, must have intended to
maximize application of Convention standards in judicial
supervision of U.S. Convention awards, including vacatur
proceedings not actually regulated by the Convention.386
However, the drafting history for § 202 clearly illustrates
that Congress intended its formulation to have a narrowing
effect, in the sense of limiting the Convention’s scope to
situations involving foreign commerce and excluding
situations only involving interstate commerce.387 To give one
382. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11
reporters’ note a(iv); DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, §
4-11 reporters’ note a(iv).
383. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (emphasis added).
384. See supra note 323-25 and accompanying text.
385. See, e.g., Hulbert, supra note 324, at 59-62 (discussing 9 U.S.C. § 202 and
emphasizing similarities with other examples of implementing legislation,
which “broadly” define the categories of international awards).
386. See, e.g., id. at 81 (expressing disbelief at the “proposition that a country’s
decision to place non-domestic awards under the Convention, as contemplated
by Article I, is without consequence for the[ir] legal status” in proceedings
seeking the vacatur of U.S. Convention awards).
387. As stated by Ambassador Richard D. Kearney in testimony before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
[W]e were faced with the problem that section 1 of the [Federal
Arbitration] [A]ct, which defines commerce, specifically includes both
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illustration of potential concerns, the U.S. delegation to the
1958 drafting conference strongly urged the United States
not to adopt the New York Convention, in part because
“[t]he application of the convention to awards ‘not
considered as domestic awards’ in the enforcing country . . .
appear[ed] to raise difficulties.”388 Specifically, under the
U.S. federal system:
[T]he courts of a given State tend to regard all out-of-State awards
as ‘foreign,’ regardless of whether they were rendered in another
State or in a foreign country. Thus, for example, awards rendered
in New York ‘are not considered as domestic awards’ in
Pennsylvania. On the basis of the wording of Article I, paragraph
1, [of the New York Convention], there appears to be a possibility
that awards rendered in any State would be foreign awards and
thus entitled to the benefits of the convention in the other States
of the Union. These benefits might be substantial in States where
the judiciary tends to take a restrictive view of arbitration. The
Conference undoubtedly had no intention of using the convention
to attain any such result, and the courts probably would hold to
that effect. None the less there is nothing squarely on point in the
Conference records, and the language of the provision would not
preclude such an interpretation. Should such an interpretation
prove valid . . . the objections are obvious. The treatment by any
State of awards handed down in other States of the Union is a
domestic matter. Hence, the convention would represent
employment of the treaty power, under the guise of a legitimate
foreign policy objective . . . to achieve a domestic result.389

interstate and foreign commerce, while the implementation of the
Convention should be concerned only with foreign commerce.
Consequently it was necessary to modify the definition of commerce to
make it quite clear that arbitration arising out of relationships in
interstate commerce remains under the original Arbitration Act and is
excluded from the operation of the proposed chapter 2.
To achieve this result, we have included in section 202 a requirement
that any case concerning an agreement or award solely between U.S.
citizens is excluded unless there is some important foreign element
involved . . . .
Kearney Statement of 1970, supra note 359, at 6 (emphasis added).
388. See W.T.M. BEALE, JR., OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2, 18, 22 (1958).
389. Id. at 18-19.
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It, thus, seems evident that the drafters of the
Convention’s implementing legislation framed § 202 not to
establish a broad new class of “non-domestic awards,” but to
prevent
courts
from
entertaining
unduly
broad
understandings of that concept. In other words, the
historical emphasis seems to be on limiting, rather than
maximizing, the Convention’s effect on U.S. practice.
As a matter of fact, the legislative histories for advice
and consent to the New York Convention and adoption of its
implementing legislation show (1) virtually no intent to
change U.S. practice and (2) a heavy preoccupation with
protecting the interests of U.S. nationals in foreign
jurisdictions. With respect to the first point, during the
Senate hearings that led to advice and consent, the State
Department’s representative opined that the New York
Convention did not even “go as far as the Federal law we
have on the books,”390 thus indicating an expectation that
ratification would entail no substantial changes to U.S. law.
Likewise, in hearings relating to adoption of the New York
Convention’s implementing legislation, the same person
deemed it “very likely that many of the arbitration
agreements falling under the Convention will provide for
arbitration outside the United States.”391 Consistent with
390. Kearney Statement of 1968, supra note 372, at 8; see also id. at 5 (“These
agreements to arbitrate and foreign arbitral awards made thereunder would be
generally recognized and enforced in the United States today. Certainly under
the Federal Arbitration Act as presently drafted these agreements would be
enforced if the jurisdictional amount and venue requirements were met.”).
391. Kearney Statement of 1970, supra note 359, at 7. During hearings
relating to advice and consent, Ambassador Kearney also emphasized the point:
The frequency with which American businessmen provide for
arbitration in contracts dealing with international transactions is
perhaps not widely appreciated. The location of goods and documents
involved in international sales transactions tends to make the natural
forum for adjudication of sales disputes the country in which the buyer
resides. Because of his lack of familiarity with foreign judicial
procedure and his desire for prompt resolution of any dispute, the
American exporter frequently inserts in his sales contracts a provision
that such disputes will be settled by arbitration either in the country of
the buyer or elsewhere by a private arbitral group—such as the Corn
Exchange of London—which has specialized expertise in dealing with
the subject matter of the contract.
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that assessment, he previously described the Convention’s
chief benefit for U.S commercial interests in the following
terms:
The convention protects the American businessman by ensuring
that agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards will be enforced
in the other countries party to the convention. Our failure to
become a party to the convention has resulted in difficulties for
American businessmen seeking to enforce arbitral awards against
parties located in foreign countries. . . .
Indeed, among the developments which impelled us to decide that
we should propose our accession is the fact that our failure to be a
party has caused our businessmen trouble in trying to obtain
enforcement of arbitration awards in foreign countries which are
parties to the convention and which rely on the reciprocity
declaration [to deny enforcement of awards rendered in states not
392
party to the convention].

Thus, while it might be possible to speculate that
Congress drafted 9 U.S.C. § 202 with an eye toward
introducing legal reforms designed to improve New York’s
reputation as an arbitral venue,393 the legislative history
provides no affirmative support for that view.
Turning next to 9 U.S.C. § 207, the fact is that provision
indisputably secures the New York Convention’s
“centerpiece,”394 namely recognition and enforcement of U.S.
Convention awards under the standards set forth in the
New York Convention. While § 207 may not immunize U.S.
Convention awards from vacatur on other grounds, the
arrangement conforms precisely to the New York
Convention, which (contrary to the UNCITRAL Model Law)
Kearney Statement of 1968, supra note 372, at 5.
392. Kearney Statement of 1968, supra note 372, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
393. See Lander Co. v. MPP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 482 (7 th Cir. 1997)
(hypothesizing that “Congress may have believed that confining enforcement
under the Convention to awards rendered abroad would drive away
international arbitration business from New York.”); cf. DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 2), supra note 5, § 4-11 reporters’ note a(iv) (justifying its
interpretation of another provision on the grounds that it would enhance “the
attractiveness of the United States as an arbitral forum”); DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(Council Draft No. 3), supra note 75, § 4-11 reporters’ note a(iv) (same).
394. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
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not only excludes vacatur from its centerpiece, but
affirmatively leaves that topic outside the scope of treaty
regulation.395 Under these circumstances, it seems evident
that the reporters aim not so much to interpret the Federal
Arbitration Act, but to redirect that statute toward the
shores of the Model Law under the sail of the New York
Convention, a mash-up of sources that represents, perhaps,
the most anomalous aspect of their work.
In this context, one should finally bear in mind that
Congress had good reasons to extend the New York
Convention’s scope to the enforcement of U.S. Convention
awards, even if that did not exclude the possibility of
vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Among other things, the
extension of coverage means that proceedings relating to
U.S.
Convention
awards
enjoy
federal
question
jurisdiction,396 more favorable rules on venue,397 greater
leeway to remove cases from state to federal court,398 and a
much longer statute of limitations for the enforcement of
awards.399 These are hardly trifling benefits. Even standing
by itself, the enlarged statute of limitations represents a
critical adjustment to the complexities of multijurisdictional enforcement proceedings.400
395. See supra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
396. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (“The district courts of the United States . . . shall have
original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount
in controversy.”).
397. 9 U.S.C. § 204.
398. 9 U.S.C. § 205.
399. Compare 9 U.S.C. §207 (three years), with 9 U.S.C. § 9 (one year).
400. In testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the topic
of legislation designed to implement the New York Convention, the State
Department’s representative explained as follows:
Section 207 deals with two problems relating to the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. The Uniform Arbitration Act has a time period
of 1 year within which an application may be made for an order
confirming an award. The Arbitration Convention does not contain any
specific provision on this point. However, all of the experts on
arbitration who worked with us considered that a 1-year period for the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards was much too short. In many
cases enforcement would normally be sought outside the United States
as a first step. An action would be filed here only after efforts to obtain
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In short, while there may be a rhetorical flourish in
protesting against the “anomaly” of establishing a category
of U.S. Convention awards and then depriving that category
of legal significance,401 the position seems less than
accurate. The fact is that a diligent parsing of text reveals
several benefits that explicitly accrue to U.S. Convention
awards under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Nothing in the statutory text or its drafting history
indicates that Congress expected those benefits to include
immunity from vacatur under the standards set forth in 9
U.S.C. § 10(a). According to the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Morrison and Weltover, statutory interpretation should
stop there.402 Applying Chapter 2 of the FAA, the
overwhelming accumulation of lower court jurisprudence
goes no farther.403 While the Draft Restatement’s effort to
“innovate” on this front may seem attractive to arbitration
specialists on policy grounds relating to global convergence
and our nation’s appeal as an arbitration venue,404 the
generalist judges who decide cases seem much more likely
to emphasize the predicate rules of statutory
interpretation,405 which render overreliance on policy
justifications a truly perilous act.

enforcement in a foreign country had failed. It was, therefore, essential
to allow time for these initial enforcement efforts outside the United
States and the consensus was that 3 years is a reasonable period in
these circumstances.
See Kearney Statement of 1970, supra note 359, at 8; see also Charles H. Brower
II, Arbitration and Antitrust: Navigating the Contours of Mandatory Law, 59
BUFF. L. REV. 1127, 1140 (2011) (observing that “the New York Convention and
the rise of a global economy have increased the relevance of multi-jurisdictional
enforcement strategies”); Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrator and “Mandatory Rules
of Law,” in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 77, 118 (George A.
Bermann & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2011) (recognizing “the transitory nature of
‘assets’ in an electronic world,” which logically increases the likelihood of
seeking enforcement of awards in multiple jurisdictions).
401. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 310-15 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 365-67, 376-77 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 310-15 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, most debates about the Draft
Restatement have focused on the merits of individual
provisions, a context in which possibilities seem wide open,
the perspectives of the U.S. arbitration bar seem ascendant,
and in which one may easily resolve differences of opinion
on the theory that reasonable people can disagree. Until
now, participants have not considered the role that drafting
standards have played, and should play, as fixed yardsticks
for measuring the provisions of U.S. Restatements on
international topics. As indicated throughout, drafting
standards represent structural elements, and their omission
throws an element of doubt on the integrity of controversial
choices made in the Draft Restatement. To remedy this
defect, this article has proposed a drafting standard based
on the Supreme Court’s likely views, not on the ultimate
policy questions, but on the predicate issues of treaty and
statutory interpretation. As demonstrated above, the Draft
Restatement gives scant attention to such issues, with the
result that its provisions on forum non conveniens and
vacatur of U.S. Convention awards lack a proper foundation
and, to this author, seem almost certainly wrong. One hopes
that the reporters and advisors will redress these
deficiencies, or that courts will have the courage to do so
when passing judgment on their work.

